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RACIAL CLASSIFICATION AND  
ASCRIPTIVE INJURY 
PAUL GOWDER

 
Slow in my blindness, with my hand I feel 
the contours of my face. A flash of light 
gets through to me. I have made out your 
hair,  
color of ash and at the same time, gold.  
I say again that I have lost no more  
than the inconsequential skin of things. 
These wise words come from Milton, and 
are noble,  
but then I think of letters and of roses. 
I think, too, that if I could see my features,  
I would know who I am, this precious 
afternoon. 
—Borges1  
 
 
  Associate Professor of Law, Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science (by courtesy), 
University of Iowa. Member, 2014–2015, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. For 
thoughts, comments, and assistance, I thank participants in the Iowa Legal Studies Workshop, the 
2014 Midwest People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference, the 2014 symposium “Outside the Box: 
A Day of Legal Philosophy at Iowa,” the Fifth Annual John Mercer Langston Writing Workshop, the 
2014 Mid-Atlantic Law and Society Association Meeting, a faculty workshop at Loyola University 
Chicago, a talk at U.C. Irvine School of Law, and far more individuals than can be singled out, both 
separately and as a part of the above-noted workshops, but including particularly Christina Bohannan, 
Kevin Brown, Bill Buss, Paul Butler, Ruth Colker, Frank Rudy Cooper, Marcella David, Jovana 
Davidovic, Tom Gallanis, Jonathan Glater, Tanya Hernandez, Herb Hovenkamp, Darren Hutchinson, 
Kimberly Jade Norwood, Osagie Obasogie, Mark Osiel, Todd Pettys, Cedric Powell, Song 
Richardson, Caroline Sheerin, SpearIt, and my excellent research assistants, Brett Holubeck and Eric 
Schmitt, as well as highly skilled yet unusually tolerant editors at the Washington University Law 
Review.  
 1. JORGE LUIS BORGES, A Blind Man, in SELECTED POEMS JORGE LUIS BORGES 357 (Alexander 
Coleman ed., Alastair Reid trans., 1999). 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article describes a new model of the relationship between racial 
ascriptions on an individual level, private racial bias, social disadvantage, 
and state action, called the cognitive hierarchical model. It argues that 
racial hierarchy in the wider culture affects our individual cognitions, and 
vice versa. Status evaluations turn out to be built deep into our racial 
perceptions. Because the state exercises a continuing influence on our 
culture and the cognitions it generates, this Article defends new grounds 
for constitutional challenge to state complicity in racial hierarchy. To be 
ascribed a stigmatized racial identity is to be subject to continuing harm, 
which this Article calls ascriptive injury. The state, by participating in the 
continual creation and reinscription of stigmatized racial identities, 
contributes to such ascriptive injuries, which for that reason must be 
subject to a constitutional remedy. 
  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss2/10
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The following diagram summarizes the entire cognitive hierarchical 
model, including the key dynamic, the bidirectional relationship between 
racial identities and hierarchical status evaluations. Arrows indicate causal 
relationships. 
 
Conventional American presumptions about our individual, day-to-day 
references to race are incorrect.
2
 In the legal system as in ordinary life, we 
talk as if racial categories track mostly clear biological and hereditary 
divisions, and using such categories merely means observing and referring 
to these divisions. This Article will call that presumption the “naive 
concept of race.” Even sophisticated observers view racial categories as 
socially constructed, but do not always identify those categories as 
normative.
3
 But the evidence from history, demography, sociology, and 
psychology shows otherwise. In fact, our everyday acts of racial 
classification—assigning racial categories to the persons we observe—are 
acts of hierarchical social stratification. The latest research reveals that we 
even assign racial identities in part based on nonracial status information 
and that those assignments change as status information changes.
4
 
 
 
 2. In the language of philosopher Sally Haslanger, our “manifest concept” of race and our 
“operative concept” have come apart. See SALLY HASLANGER, RESISTING REALITY: SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTION AND SOCIAL CRITIQUE 387–90 (2012) (explaining that manifest concept is how we 
think we use a concept and operative concept is how the concept actually functions in our social 
world).  
 3. There are exceptions, including HASLANGER, supra note 2, who has recognized that these 
categories inherently are hierarchical; this Article helps support her claims with concrete evidence. In 
future work, I will more directly consider the role of philosophical conceptual analyses like 
Haslanger’s in helping the legal system as well as social science sort through the problems of racial 
hierarchy. 
 4. This Article refers primarily to third-party racial assignments, or “racial ascriptions”: when 
one person decides that someone else is a member of some race. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Moreover, those status evaluations are built into our low-level perceptual 
processes: neuroscientific evidence reveals that hierarchical status 
evaluations occur even at the level of visual processing, as we observe and 
place persons into racial categories.
5
 
Consequently, persons ascribed racial categories in the contemporary 
United States
6
 are subjected to hierarchical social identities. Those at the 
bottom of the hierarchy are subjected to a tainted (or stigmatized) identity. 
In the United States, the stigma particularly falls on those ascribed the 
identity “black.” This Article primarily focuses on this racial category for 
two reasons. First, it describes the victims of the starkest hierarchy in our 
history and contemporary politics. Second, it has been the subject of the 
most extensive investigation in social science and history (although where 
evidence is available with respect to other categories I have drawn on it).
7
  
Our racial categories acquire legal implications because the state 
supports them. The stigmatized racial ascriptions we suffer under today 
are constructed in substantial part out of implicit and explicit stereotypes 
and implicit affective biases, which are in turn facilitated by physical 
isolation and by social disadvantage visibly associated with racial 
divisions. The state, with its laws, props up both of these phenomena.  
 
 
 5. See infra Part II.B. 
 6. In view of the cultural contingency of racial cognition (about which see infra III.A), we 
should not expect other countries to “do race” the same way. However, see HASLANGER, supra note 2, 
at 237 (describing similar dynamics in Brazil, in which social class and education feed into racial 
ascriptions). 
 7. See, e.g., Michael S. North & Susan T. Fiske, Social Categories Create and Reflect 
Inequality: Psychological and Sociological Insights, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL STATUS 249 
(Joey T. Cheng, Jessica L. Tracy & Cameron Anderson eds., 2014) (“Primarily, psychological social 
psychology has focused on Black and White categories of inequality.”). However, it is important to 
note that this focus on blackness is not meant to exclude the application of the theory to other 
nonwhite groups in American society. Rather, it reflects only constraints of space and of the existing 
scientific literature. Mindful of the critique of race scholarship’s excessive focus on the black/white 
binary, see, e.g., Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development and Future Directions of Critical Race 
Theory and Related Scholarship, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 329, 350–51 (2006) (describing critique of early 
critical race theory’s focus on blackness and whiteness), further scholarship is needed to investigate 
the application of the cognitive hierarchical model to other racial ascriptions. 
 This Article uses “black” rather than “African-American” to capture the visual, not geographic, 
nature of the racial cleavage in our society. We apply racial categories upon looking at someone, and 
on the naive concept we usually do so on the basis of skin color. Also, geographic labels for races are 
particularly misleading: it’s possible for someone to have physical characteristics that are usually 
classified as “black” even though his or her ancestors are mostly from continents other than Africa, 
and in day-to-day practice we do not inquire into the ancestral origins of someone beyond a generation 
or two. Finally, there is substantial evidence that practices of discrimination and hierarchy revolve 
around skin hue even apart from categorical ascriptions of geographic heritage. See generally COLOR 
MATTERS: SKIN TONE BIAS AND THE MYTH OF A POSTRACIAL AMERICA (Kimberly Jade Norwood ed., 
2013); Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487 (2000). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss2/10
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In particular, laws establishing municipal boundaries and other 
arbitrary geographic divisions in access to public goods, which are de 
facto allocated along racial lines, support both the physical isolation of 
those with stigmatized racial identities and the continuing visible 
disadvantage of those groups. While this is certainly not the only way that 
the state supports racial hierarchy, such laws provide important support to 
racial stigma. Physical isolation limits the exposure of whites to 
nonwhites, leading to “illusory correlation”: a phenomenon in which 
negative attributes are more readily attributed to nonwhites.
8
 Disadvantage 
also supports stereotypes and affective bias. For example, black poverty 
supports the stereotype that blacks are lazy, and disparate policing in black 
communities supports the stereotype that blacks are prone to crime. 
Because the state is complicit in creating racial stigma and its 
consequences, Equal Protection doctrine should expand to encompass a 
remedy for ascriptive injury.
9
 In the words of Louis Brandeis, “Our 
Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it 
teaches the whole people by its example.”10 Today, our government 
teaches racial hierarchy by offering the support of its laws to the practices 
that make it up, and by neglecting to intervene on the continuing 
conditions created by its laws of the past. It must be made to stop doing so. 
This dynamic leads to (at least) two concrete doctrinal consequences. 
First, because segregation supports stigmatized racial identities, legal 
regimes that create or support racialized spaces—physical spaces socially 
identified with subordinated or superordinated racial groups, along which 
benefits and burdens are allocated—should be subject to Equal Protection 
challenge regardless of whether those spaces are the product of conscious 
racial discrimination. This requires a modification (though not a complete 
abandonment) of the rule in Washington v. Davis requiring state racial 
discrimination to be “intentional” before triggering strict scrutiny.11 It also 
requires a modification of the rule, most clearly expressed in Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, that state 
remedial action against racialized spaces, such as de facto segregated 
schools, is only permissible to the extent the racialized spaces are the 
product of intentional state discrimination.
12
  
 
 
 8. See discussion infra notes 62–64 and accompanying text. 
 9. I thank Jonathan Glater for pressing me to make this inferential step explicit. 
 10. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 11. 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). 
 12. 551 U.S. 701, 721 (2007). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Second, legal injuries both supporting and stemming from stigmatized 
racial identities should be understood as continuing, not isolated, injuries 
to every member of the class potentially subjected to those injuries. Thus, 
cases such as City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, which denied standing for 
injunctive relief to the victim of a seemingly racially discriminatory 
chokehold, should be overruled.
13
 
Ultimately, this Article aims to reclaim the concept of colorblindness 
from the opponents of affirmative action. Stripping state support from 
hierarchical and ascriptive racial categories will promote, or at least stop 
standing in the way of, a genuine colorblindness—one in which 
individuals as well as society are blind to the status classifications built 
into our practice of drawing racial categories. But the road to true 
colorblindness must go through public as well as private efforts at 
integration, and those efforts cannot be effective without paying attention 
to race.
14
  
The colorblindness of this Article is not what conventional discussions 
of the idea take colorblindness to be. Typically by “colorblindness” it is 
meant that government actions should not take race into account. Critical 
race scholars have rightly argued that such colorblindness is no solution to 
the problem of American racial hierarchy.
15
 The reason that these scholars 
are right, this Article argues, is because such colorblindness—in the 
unlikely event the American governments ever managed to achieve it—
would be embedded in a self-reinforcing system of racial hierarchy where 
the consequences of past and present intentional racial discrimination 
persist and require conscious remediation.  
 
 
 13. 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
 14. A word of caution. This Article does not argue that racial identity, though stigmatized, cannot 
be the appropriate subject of solidarity or pride. Racial solidarity and racial stigma operate from 
different points of view. Racial solidarity and pride are first-person phenomena, relating to roles one 
accepts and identities one endorses, respectively. By contrast, racial stigma is primarily a third-person 
phenomenon. That being said, phenomena such as stereotype threat suggest that racial stigma can be 
experienced from the first-person standpoint as well. See infra note 68 and accompanying text. In 
general victims of racial stigma are involuntarily assigned identities and the negative social 
consequences that flow from those identities. One of the many injuries of racial stigma is that it makes 
it harder to achieve racial (or other) pride: to be ascribed a stigmatized race is to lack the social support 
for a positive self-identification. See BELL HOOKS, WE REAL COOL: BLACK MEN AND MASCULINITY, 
at x (2003) (describing constraints stigmatic stereotypes impose on black men’s self-identification). 
 However, the notion of racial pride must be taken with some caution. Kwame Anthony Appiah 
has expressed the worry that racial ascriptions may be so powerful that insisting on racial identities 
(where “identities” bears a first-person, chosen meaning, as opposed to third-person “ascriptions”) 
swamps other features of the individual, and in doing so makes the bearers of salient (i.e., non-
normative, nonwhite) racial identities worse off and less free to be individuals. See K. ANTHONY 
APPIAH & AMY GUTMANN, COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF RACE 97–99 (1996). 
 15. See Mutua, supra note 7, at 334–37.  
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By contrast, this Article argues for a different kind of colorblindness, at 
the end of a very long road. True colorblindness cannot be directly 
achieved just by willing the suppression of our racial cognitions. Rather, it 
can only be achieved indirectly, by the color-conscious abolition of the 
social circumstances that build racial hierarchy into our very perceptions. 
Directly pursuing colorblindness by pretending that race is not relevant to 
contemporary decisions is likely to reinforce those social circumstances, 
and in doing so defeat the goal of true colorblindness. For that reason, 
colorblindness should be understood as an instance of what Jon Elster has 
called “states that are essentially by-products”: goals that cannot be 
achieved directly.
16
  
The cognitive hierarchical model also has the potential to help provide 
what might be called microfoundations for the project of critical race 
theory. In 2003, Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati pointed out that critical 
race theory ordinarily operated “at the macro level, focusing primarily on 
legal and sociopolitical processes,” and they suggested more attention be 
paid to “the interpersonal ways in which race is produced.”17 At the time, 
critical race scholars had not yet pursued the psychological path to those 
microfoundations very far.
18
 This has changed, and there is now an active 
psychological wing of the critical race theory research program.
19
 To that 
literature this Article contributes the explicit recognition of what has 
heretofore largely been implicit: the psychology of race interacts with the 
social formation of race—another topic of great interest within critical race 
theory.
20
 That is, the social phenomena that construct our racial categories 
directly influence and are influenced by psychological phenomena on the 
individual level.
21
  
The cognitive hierarchical model also contributes to the account of a 
long-recognized phenomenon in critical race theory: the interaction 
between expressive and more concrete forms of racial subordination. 
 
 
 16. JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 43 (1983). Elster 
is skeptical of even indirect pursuit of such states, but we need not go so far to understand the 
difficulty of directly pursuing colorblindness. See id. at 43–44, 86–100. 
 17. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 
YALE L.J. 1757, 1760–61 (2003) (reviewing CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE 
THEORY (Francisco Valdes, Jerome McCristal Culp & Angela P. Harris eds., 2002)). 
 18. Id. at 1764–65. 
 19. See, e.g., works cited infra Part II. 
 20. See generally Carbado & Gulati, supra note 17, at 1769–71 (discussing racial formation 
theory). 
 21. It thus aims to help answer the “critical call” raised by Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Twenty 
Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking Back to Move Forward, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1253, 1349 (2011), 
“to help contribute to a counter-narrative of how prevailing ideas about race have come to be.” 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Expressive, or “symbolic,” progress can substitute for, and thus impair, 
material progress.
22
 However, the absence of expressive progress can also 
impair material progress. This Article contributes to the account of the 
latter phenomenon by tracing the connections between the symbolic 
construction of race and concrete racial disadvantage through the 
psychological research on racial cognition and conceptualization. 
This Article is divided into four Parts. Part I identifies the doctrinal 
difficulties created by the U.S. Supreme Court’s failure to recognize the 
insidious effect of state action on racial cognition. It focuses on two lines 
of caselaw, each represented by two central cases. First is the line of cases 
requiring intent to create a remedy for state racial discrimination, either in 
the form of a suit under the Equal Protection Clause (Washington v. Davis) 
or in the form of a compelling interest sufficient to permit race-conscious 
integration (Parents Involved).
23
 Second is the line of cases denying 
standing to seek injunctive relief based on supposedly isolated race-based 
injuries (Lyons), or state support for racial stigmas (Allen v. Wright).
24
 
Part II discusses the social practice of making racial classifications. It 
argues, on the basis of sociological and psychological evidence, that our 
practice of identifying individuals with races is tainted by hierarchical 
social statuses: identifying someone as a member of a racial group 
involves making a judgment about that person’s place in a social 
hierarchy. With racially subordinated identities (the evidence is mostly 
about blackness), these judgments are typically negative and harmful. This 
is true even at the perceptual level. Neuroscientists and psychologists have 
shown that attitudes toward subordinated races leak out even as faces are 
first perceived, and influence the racial content of those perceptions.
25
 
Moreover, the relationship is bidirectional. Racial ascriptions influence the 
 
 
 22. See id. at 1313 n.192 (“[R]acial oppression is constituted by symbolic [as] well as material 
dimensions, however symbolic change is often taken as indicative of substantive transformation.”). 
 23. To be more precise, the objection in this Article is to what Ian Haney-López calls “malicious 
intent” doctrine. Ian Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1785 (2012). For 
Haney-López, “contextual intent” is the intent doctrine used at the time of the civil rights movement 
and referred, not to any specific state of mind on behalf of some government agent, but to behavior 
that was “generally understood” to be discriminatory—in the nature of the behavior itself. Id. at 1785, 
1790. By contrast, “malicious intent” refers to a state of mind: the state actor intentionally pursues 
injury or benefit to some targeted racial group(s). Id. at 1833. Haney-López criticizes scholars who 
blame Washington v. Davis for the Court’s move from contextual intent to malicious intent. Id. at 
1785, 1814–15. This Article need not take a position on that debate—Washington v. Davis is used here 
to stand in for the entire line of cases decided under its authority, including those that have relied on 
malicious intent. When this Article uses “intent,” it is meant to refer to the contemporary (“malicious”) 
understanding of intent doctrine. 
 24. 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
 25. See infra Part II.B. 
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stereotypes and attitudes we apply to people, and those stereotypes and 
attitudes in turn influence racial ascriptions.
26
  
Part III traces out the causes of these individual judgments in group 
hierarchy. It argues that Americans’ individual acts of ascriptive racial 
classification are rooted in social practices of racial oppression. It then 
traces the historical roots of these practices from seventeenth-century 
Virginia to the present and describes the intertwined actions of the state 
and private individuals in supporting them, both in generating the original 
racial classifications and in reinforcing their association with status 
categories.  
Part IV argues that many of our municipal and other boundaries are 
subject to Equal Protection challenge, contra the intent requirement 
described in Part I, because they support the stigma described in Part II by 
propping up the inequalities described in Part III. This part is based on my 
previous research on the relationship between the normative ideal of the 
rule of law and Equal Protection.
27
 Part IV also argues that the standing 
rules described in Part I must be modified to provide access to injunctive 
relief challenging state perpetuation of hierarchical racial categories.  
I. HOW CURRENT DOCTRINE MISSES RACIAL HIERARCHY 
A. The Intent Requirement 
In 1976, the Supreme Court settled a persistent question under Equal 
Protection Clause doctrine: would a plaintiff be able to challenge racially 
disparate state action for its disparate impact, absent a showing that some 
state agent intended to create such an impact?
28
 The Court squarely 
answered: no.
29
 The plaintiffs in Washington v. Davis had challenged a 
pre-employment test used to hire police officers, on the theory that the test 
in question disproportionately excluded black officer candidates and had 
not been shown to be relevant to the job.
30
 However, this standard applies 
in broader contexts, including when de facto racial segregation is subject 
to constitutional challenge. Plaintiffs must show either by direct evidence 
 
 
 26. See infra Parts II, III.A. 
 27. See Paul Gowder, Equal Law in an Unequal World, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1021 (2014) 
(explaining relationship between public reason conception of the rule of law principle of generality 
and Equal Protection); see also Paul Gowder, The Rule of Law and Equality, 32 L. & PHIL. 565 (2013) 
(giving theory of the rule of law).  
 28. Contrast the constitutional rule with Title VII, which explicitly provides for a disparate 
impact cause of action in employment discrimination cases. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2010).  
 29. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238–48 (1976). 
 30. Id. at 233–36. 
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or by inference that the state intended to bring about segregation—a state 
policy that merely causes segregation, without such intent, is not subject to 
challenge.
31
 
This rule applies not just to private causes of action that challenge state 
racial discrimination, but also to preemptive state action aiming to abolish 
the state’s own racial discrimination. Under current doctrine, the state 
ordinarily cannot act preemptively unless the racial discrimination to be 
remedied is intentional. Thus, in Parents Involved, the Court held that 
school desegregation cannot be carried out, even if a school is de facto 
segregated (what the Court called “racial imbalance in the schools, without 
more”),32 in the absence of intentional state discrimination.33 The Court 
did so over a dissent from Justice Breyer, who pointed out that the state 
has a compelling interest “in overcoming the adverse educational effects 
produced by and associated with highly segregated schools”34—an interest 
that, on its terms, is indifferent to whether the segregation is de jure or de 
facto, intentional or inadvertent—as well as the presence of “persisting 
injustices” traceable to historical discrimination35 and its impact on 
“housing patterns, employment practices, economic conditions, and social 
attitudes.”36  
B. Ignoring Racial Harm  
The Court has also persistently held that blacks lack standing to seek 
injunctive relief for continued state injury to their equal standing, even in 
cases that would otherwise be subject to Equal Protection challenge. The 
leading case along these lines is Lyons. Adolph Lyons was a black man, 
subjected to a highly dangerous chokehold after being pulled over for a 
burned-out taillight.
37
 In view of the general racial patterns of the exercise 
of police discretion,
38
 it seems likely that Mr. Lyons was subjected to this 
 
 
 31. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) 
(rejecting claim with respect to de facto segregation caused by zoning policy, in absence of intent 
showing); City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981) (rejecting challenge to street closure 
separating black neighborhood from white neighborhood on basis that discriminatory intent had not 
been shown); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979) (plaintiff had offered sufficient 
evidence to permit inference of intentional school segregation). 
 32. 551 U.S. 701, 721 (2007) (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 n.14 (1977)). 
 33.  Id. at 720–21. 
 34. Id. at 839 (Breyer, J., dissenting). He also cites evidence of resegregation since the end of the 
court-ordered desegregation era. Id. at 869–72. 
 35. Id. at 844–45. 
 36. Id. at 838. 
 37. 461 U.S. 95, 114–15 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
 38. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
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chokehold because of his race, but the police did not include such 
discrimination in their official policy. The Court had previously held, in 
another standing case—Rizzo v. Goode—that plaintiffs lack standing to 
sue for injunctive relief against racially-disparate police abuse unless that 
abuse was carried out as a matter of policy.
39
 Accordingly, while in the 
background, the issue of race discrimination was not explicitly presented 
in Lyons. Lyons instead brought a claim alleging that the department, as a 
matter of policy/practice, applied chokeholds arbitrarily. However, 
because he could not show that he personally was likely to be subjected to 
chokeholds in the future, he was denied standing.
40
 The combination of 
Lyons and Rizzo suggests that even in actions against egregiously racist 
state conduct, a plaintiff in an injunctive relief case must show (a) that the 
conduct was a matter of policy, and (b) that the policy essentially 
commands the plaintiff be subject to that conduct in the future. This is an 
impossibly high standing bar.
41
  
Similarly, in Allen v. Wright, the Court denied standing to plaintiffs 
seeking to challenge the IRS’s failure to enforce its policy of denying tax 
exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools.
42
 The plaintiffs had 
attempted to bring a class action, alleging that black parents and students 
in general were harmed by state support for segregated schools and 
assistance to private efforts to avoid desegregation.
43
 The court entertained 
the notion that plaintiffs had “a claim of stigmatic injury, or denigration, 
suffered by all members of a racial group when the Government 
discriminates on the basis of race.”44 However, even as the Court 
acknowledged that “this sort of noneconomic injury is one of the most 
serious consequences of discriminatory government action,” it nonetheless 
held that the plaintiffs had not “personally been denied equal treatment,” 
and accordingly rejected their claim to standing.
45
 
 
 
 39. 423 U.S. 362 (1976). 
 40. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105–07; see also O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (rejecting 
injunctive race discrimination claims against state court for failure to show personal injury). 
 41. Despite this, the Court sometimes finds that whites have standing to challenge affirmative 
action programs without similar evidence of a redressable injury. See generally Girardeau A. Spann, 
Color-Coded Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1422, 1455–65 (1995) (describing pattern of granting 
standing to white challengers to programs that benefit minorities, while denying standing to minority 
challengers to programs that disadvantage them); Adam D. Chandler, How (Not) to Bring an 
Affirmative-Action Challenge, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 85 (2012), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/ 
1102_o64bg8c4.pdf (raising similar points with respect to Fisher v. Texas affirmative action 
litigation), archived at http://perma.cc/9ZU6-Q963. 
 42. 468 U.S. 737, 743–45 (1984). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 754. 
 45. Id. at 755 (citation omitted). 
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In Part IV, this Article will argue that both of these lines of cases 
should be partially overruled. The intent cases should be overruled (1) to 
the extent they permit the state to unintentionally support the existence of 
racialized spaces, and thereby, support existing racial hierarchies and 
stigmatized racial identities, and (2) more broadly to permit challenges to 
all state support for racial hierarchy, intentional or otherwise. The standing 
cases should be overruled to the extent they fail to recognize the 
continuing injury suffered by each individual in a subordinated racial 
group from hierarchical racial ascriptions as well as their concrete 
consequences, and refuse a remedy to those plaintiffs that bring suit 
against the state for reinforcing those ascriptions.  
II. HOW IS RACIAL CLASSIFICATION HIERARCHICAL? 
This Part presents the core of the cognitive hierarchical model: the 
claims that when we see race, we also see status, and that status judgments 
affect our racial judgments, and vice versa. The model rejects the naive 
concept of race, according to which race is first observed as a biological 
category, and then status hierarchies are applied after the fact and only by 
“racists.” It suggests instead that ordinary people who would not ordinarily 
be described as racists assign high status to whiteness and low status to 
blackness.
46
  
Part II.A describes the evidence for this phenomenon as it operates 
among social groups, via stereotypes and attitudinal biases. It relies on the 
well-known psychological evidence for implicit attitudes and stereotypes, 
and demonstrates that when people assign membership in a subordinated 
racial group to someone, they place that person in a group social hierarchy. 
Part II.A further details the consequences of those psychological 
assignments.
47
  
 
 
 46. This is a familiar claim of critical race theory, which usually goes under the name “white 
supremacy,” and which this Article locates in a novel theoretical framework. See generally RICHARD 
DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 7–10 (2012) 
(summarizing the research program).  
 47. Some (though not all) of the results in parts II.A and II.B are subject to a risk of racial bias 
themselves, due to either underrepresentation of nonwhite groups in experimental subject populations 
or failure to account for different effects among subjects in different racial groups. It is well known 
that blacks and whites perceive racial discrimination differently, see generally Russell K. Robinson, 
Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (2008) (describing differing perceptions of racial 
hierarchy between whites and blacks), and more deeply rooted psychological processes around race 
likely operate differently across racial lines as well (not least because the informational differences 
across racial groups that Robinson describes could influence things like the content of stereotypes and 
affective biases). See, e.g., Margaret Shih et al., The Social Construction of Race: Biracial Identity and 
Vulnerability to Stereotypes, 13 CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCH. 125 (2007) 
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Part II.B describes the evidence for the hierarchical nature of racial 
ascription as it operates in individual acts of racial perception and 
classification. Individual judgments, at least in some instances, precede 
group judgments: we conclude someone is of low status and, for that 
reason, ascribe a stigmatized racial group to that person.  
Finally, Part II.C gives a novel theoretical framework—the heart of the 
cognitive hierarchical model—for understanding our social practice of 
racial perception in light of the evidence. 
By way of caveat, I am a consumer, not a producer, of psychological 
and sociological research. The theory given in this Article is best 
understood as a non-comprehensive reading of a body of scientific work 
for the theoretical traction it might offer on social phenomena critical to 
constitutional law. For that reason, it is necessarily tentative and subject to 
revision or rejection from psychologists and sociologists. Such is the risk 
of interdisciplinarity; the reward for undertaking that risk is the 
opportunity to draw an expansive, cross-disciplinary picture of incredibly 
complex social phenomena, like race. Like a map, the further out we 
zoom, the more we can see the shape of the land, but only with some 
corresponding loss of detail. However, maps are necessary for a full 
understanding of our world, racial as well as physical, and someone has to 
sketch them out, with necessarily incomplete knowledge, before the 
interrelationships between these different areas of study can be seen. The 
mapmaker must write with an appropriate degree of humility.
48
  
A. Racial Hierarchy 
Our racial classification practices are hierarchical at two levels. This 
subpart develops the claim that racial classification is hierarchical at the 
group level. Individuals within our culture (both members of 
hierarchically superordinate groups and of subordinate groups, e.g., who 
have internalized racial stigma) attribute negative, low-status 
 
 
(giving example). However, as the socially dominant racial group, the perceptions and behaviors of 
those identified as white are most likely to influence overall social, cultural, and legal practices in the 
United States; accordingly, it is appropriate to build a theory concerning such practices from studies 
that primarily focus on their cognitions. 
 48. This approach follows a substantial tradition of transdisciplinary scholarship on race. See 
IMANI PERRY, MORE BEAUTIFUL AND MORE TERRIBLE: THE EMBRACE AND TRANSCENDENCE OF 
RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2011) (listing other scholars who have taken the 
“bricolage” track). For a more comprehensive overview of the psychological research on the process 
of racial and other group classification, see Galen V. Bodenhausen, Sonia K. Kang & Destiny Peery, 
Social Categorization and the Perception of Social Groups, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL 
COGNITION 311–29 (Susan T. Fiske & C. Neil Macrae eds., 2012). 
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characteristics to subordinated racial groups and have negative affective 
responses to them. This social practice indirectly affects individuals 
ascribed subordinated identities by subjecting them to a higher probability 
of social disadvantage. While this claim is fairly conventional, this subpart 
clarifies its meaning. The next two subparts develop the more novel claim 
that racial classification is hierarchical on the individual level.  
First, the claim made more precise is this: to describe someone as a 
member of a race is to describe that person as a member of a group, where 
the groups in question are ordered in a status hierarchy. On the group-level 
version of the claim, to say race is hierarchical is not to say that 
identifying an individual’s race is to identify his or her place in a social 
hierarchy. The hierarchy in a racial category applies directly to groups, not 
individuals—black people as a group are socially subordinated, not black 
people as individuals.
49
 Individual members of a socially subordinated 
group can themselves lack social subordination, because numerous 
variables can affect one’s place in an overall social hierarchy, only one of 
which is race.  
The best way to understand the individual impact of group hierarchy is 
probabilistic. Racial hierarchy entails that the probability of a person 
experiencing social disadvantage increases conditional on holding a 
subordinated racial ascription; the probability of a person experiencing 
social advantage increases conditional on holding a superordinated racial 
ascription. Importantly, this probabilistic claim is causally neutral: it is 
consistent both with the inflicting of disadvantage on those with 
subordinate racial ascriptions and with the inflicting of subordinate racial 
ascriptions on those who have suffered disadvantage. To say that racial 
hierarchy is a function of racial classification, as this Article does, is to say 
that the act of identifying a person as a member of one of those groups 
increases the probability that social subordination is inflicted on that 
person. 
We must add one more condition to the definition of racial hierarchy. It 
should be distinctively racial. For, in principle, racial groups could be 
probabilistically associated with social disadvantage due to nonracial 
mediating factors.
50
 For example, a group of immigrants of color could be 
disadvantaged not in virtue of their racial ascriptions, but in virtue of their 
recent migration. To exclude such cases, we should limit the notion of 
racial hierarchy to those cases where an individual experiences a higher 
 
 
 49. This is a weaker claim than that advanced by HASLANGER, supra note 2, at 326–37. 
 50. Cf. HASLANGER, supra note 2, at 331–32 (elucidating distinction between primary and 
secondary oppression). 
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probability of being disadvantaged (advantaged) due to his or her being 
ascribed a subordinate (superordinate) racial identity; or, to reverse the 
causal direction again, an individual experiences a higher probability of 
being ascribed a subordinate (superordinate) racial identity due to his or 
her experience of social disadvantage (advantage). 
Evidence for the claim that the United States currently is a racial 
hierarchy comes primarily from the psychological literature on 
stereotyping and implicit affective bias. Together, this literature suggests 
that a substantial proportion of the population experiences negative affect 
from, and draws negative inferences about, stigmatized racial groups, and 
acts on it. And it suggests that stereotypes and affective biases are 
activated by the salience of racial categories: to attend to race is to have 
these negative cognitions. A description of this evidence follows. 
Today, scholars in psychology and sociology typically focus on 
implicit or unconscious racism, reflecting the social sanctions attached to 
acting out conscious racism. However, it is important to note that the latter 
still exists and can manifest in settings where acting out racist preferences 
cannot be punished. For example, a substantial number of whites voting in 
the 2008 Democratic primary were willing to admit to pollsters (if not to 
their friends and neighbors) that they voted against Barack Obama due to 
his race.
51
 Media also replicate stereotypes of blacks in a way that is hard 
to describe as “unconscious” or “implicit.”52 Even our major social 
institutions occasionally get caught in egregious explicit racial bias. For 
example, in 2009, Wells Fargo was sued for targeting black communities 
with disadvantageous subprime loans. According to one employee’s 
affidavit, “[t]hey referred to subprime loans made in minority 
communities as ghetto loans and minority customers as ‘those people have 
 
 
 51. Galen V. Bodenhausen & Jennifer A. Richeson, Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination, 
in ADVANCED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE 347 (Roy F. Baumeister & Eli J. 
Finkel eds., 2010). 
 52. See generally Tia Tyree, African American Stereotypes in Reality Television, 22 HOW. J. 
COMM. 394 (2011) (reviewing literature on stereotyped representations of blacks on television, and 
reporting on replication of these stereotypes in contemporary reality TV). Television representations of 
black stereotypes do influence attitudes toward blacks. See, e.g., Travis L. Dixon & Keith B. Maddox, 
Skin Tone, Crime News, and Social Reality Judgments: Priming the Stereotype of the Dark and 
Dangerous Black Criminal, 35 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1555 (2005) (reviewing literature on 
disparate news association of blacks with crime, and showing, via experimental evidence, that crime 
news stories involving darker-skinned blacks elicited greater emotional response). See also Travis L. 
Dixon & Daniel Linz, Race and the Misrepresentation of Victimization on Local Television News, 27 
COMM. RES. 547 (2000) (providing evidence for overrepresentation in television news of whites as 
crime victims and blacks as perpetrators). 
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bad credit’, ‘those people don’t pay their bills’ and ‘mud people.’”53 In 
December 2013, Ally Financial settled a Department of Justice suit 
alleging it charged higher interest rates to racial minorities, independent of 
their objective creditworthiness.
54
 In general, the social unacceptability 
and yet persistence of some explicitly racist views is vividly illustrated in 
Eduardo’ Bonilla-Silva’s account of interviewees who descend into total 
incoherence as they utter things like their opposition to interracial 
marriage, thrown by the dissonance between their stated egalitarian 
ideologies and the racist views they were affirming.
55
 
However, as noted, the chief focus of contemporary research is in 
implicit racism.
56
 On the “Implicit Association Test,” over sixty percent of 
every racial group except blacks displayed an affective bias for whites 
over blacks.
57
  
 
 
 53. Michael Powell, Bank Accused of Pushing Mortgage Deals on Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/07/us/07baltimore.html?%2359;gwt=regi&%2359=&_r=2&% 
2359;=&pagewanted=all. The suit and several others were ultimately settled for $175 million. Charlie 
Savage, Wells Fargo Will Settle Mortgage Bias Charges, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/business/wells-fargo-to-settle-mortgage-discrimination-charges. 
html. 
 54. Chris Isidore, Ally to Pay $98 Million for Car Loan Bias, CNNMONEY, Dec. 20, 2013, 
http://money.cnn.com/2013/12/20/news/companies/ally-car-loan-discrimination/, archived at http://perma. 
cc/B6Y5-VJRU. As of this writing, the City of Los Angeles has just filed yet another lawsuit, alleging 
mortgage lending discrimination against J.P. Morgan Chase. Complaint, City of Los Angeles v. 
JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. 14-04168 (C.D. Cal. May 30, 2013), available at https://consumer 
mediallc.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/lacityp_028287.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Q9MD-SSYQ. 
According to that lawsuit, “a regression analysis that controls for credit history and other factors 
demonstrates that an African-American JPMorgan borrower was 1.795 times more likely to receive a 
predatory loan than a white borrower, and a Latino borrower 1.576 times more likely.” Complaint at 6, 
City of Los Angeles v. JPMorgan Chase & Co. (Midway through the editorial process for this Article, 
this complaint was dismissed on procedural grounds with leave to refile. See Order Granting 
Defendants Motion to Dismiss With Leave to Amend, City of Los Angeles v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 
No. 14-04168 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2014), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FH-
CA-0015-0002.pdf. 
 55. EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND THE 
PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 115–18 (4th ed. 2014).  
 56. See generally Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005); Anthony 
G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945 
(2006). 
 57. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 56, at 958. Strikingly, the test in question was carried out 
on a self-selected internet sample. Id. Ordinarily, we might expect such subjects to be less racist than 
the general population, since they were sufficiently self-aware to choose to take a test about their racial 
attitudes. It is important to note that the Implicit Association Test, and the notion of measuring implicit 
bias in general, has been subject to some criticism. See, e.g., Etienne P. LeBel & Sampo V. Paunonen, 
Sexy But Often Unreliable: The Impact of Unreliability on the Replicability of Experimental Findings 
with Implicit Measures, 37 PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 570 (2011), and literature cited 
therein; Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Consequential Validity of the Implicit Association Test, 61 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 56, 60 (2006) (citing and answering IAT critics). However, there is evidence that 
implicit attitude measures display substantially better predictive validity than self-report measures of 
black-white racial bias. See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss2/10
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Researchers have distinguished implicit stereotypes and implicit 
prejudice, proposing that the former are evaluative (i.e., hold descriptive 
content, like “blacks are lazy” or “blacks are good at sports”) and the latter 
are affective (e.g., having an aversion to blacks).
58
 The two can be 
experimentally distinguished (e.g., testing association of particular 
concepts like athleticism with blacks, versus testing association of pleasant 
or unpleasant words), and produce different effects on behavior, although 
both appear in study populations.
59
 Stereotype content appears to be 
largely consistent between those who admit to believing the stereotypes 
and those who do not, although the extent to which subjects admit to 
believing the stereotypes appears to have decreased.
60
 Stereotype traits of 
blacks include “lazy,” “athletic,” “rhythmic,” “low in intelligence,” 
“poor,” “criminal,” “hostile,” and “loud.”61 
 
 
Association Test: III. Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 17, 
29–30 (2009). For that reason it may be that implicit measures, however imperfect, are our most 
reliable scientific tool. As I am no psychologist, I do not purport to judge these debates—we must use 
the best science we have until something better comes along. Similar points apply to worries about the 
current “replication crisis” in psychology, particularly with respect to priming studies. See generally 
Wolfgang Stroebe & Fritz Strack, The Alleged Crisis and the Illusion of Exact Replication, 9 
PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 59 (2014) (describing debates over failure to replicate a number of 
priming studies). As non-psychologists who have to make sense of the world in order to make policy, 
the best we can do is recognize that all scientific research is imperfect and subject to upset by new 
evidence, and to move forward under conditions of necessarily incomplete knowledge using the best 
evidence we have available. The IAT is discussed further infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
 58. David M. Amodio & Patricia G. Devine, Stereotyping and Evaluation in Implicit Race Bias: 
Evidence for Independent Constructs and Unique Effects on Behavior, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 652, 657 (2006). 
 59. Id. See also Srividya Ramasubramanian, Testing the Cognitive-Affective Consistency Model 
of Intercultural Attitudes: Do Stereotypical Perceptions Influence Prejudicial Feelings?, 39 J. 
INTERCULTURAL COMM. RES. 105, 116 (2010) (developing further the notion that affective and 
cognitive evaluations of blacks do not simply track one another).  
 60. Patricia G. Devine & Andrew J. Elliot, Are Racial Stereotypes Really Fading?: The 
Princeton Trilogy Revisited, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1139, 1146–48 (1995). 
 61. Id. at 1144. See also Ramasubramanian, supra note 59, at 108–09 (reviewing literature giving 
similar lists of stereotyped traits); John F. Dovidio et al., Racial Stereotypes: The Contents of Their 
Cognitive Representations, 22 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 22, 27 (1986) (associating 
“ambitious” and “practical” with whites, along with “conventional” and “stubborn”; “lazy” and 
“imitative” associated with blacks along with “musical” and “sensitive”). Perhaps the most shocking 
result is the lingering association of blacks with apes. See Phillip Atiba Goff et al., Not Yet Human: 
Implicit Knowledge, Historical Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 292, 304 (2008) (finding that there is an implicit association between 
black faces and images of apes in study populations, independent of implicit attitudinal bias against 
blacks; priming with pictures of apes led respondents to more readily excuse police violence against 
blacks; and blacks are more likely than whites to be described in apelike fashion in media crime 
reports); see also Phillip Atiba Goff et al., The Essence of Innocence: Consequences of Dehumanizing 
Black Children, 106 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 526 (2014) (reporting numerous results on the 
relative dehumanization of blacks, overestimation of the age of black suspects, and effect of those 
biases on policing). 
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Let us first consider stereotypes. Psychologists have proposed various 
mechanisms to explain stereotype formation, but one of the most 
important for present purposes relies on familiar mechanisms from the 
cognitive bias literature: nonminorities have greater cognitive access to 
negative behaviors associated with minorities because of the increased 
salience of negative behaviors, as well as the increased salience of 
minority groups.
62
 This is known to social psychologists as “illusory 
correlation.”63 Stripping off the jargon, whites remember black people 
more readily than white people, simply because they are exposed to fewer 
black people, and we all remember crime more readily than non-crime. 
Consequently, whites are more likely to remember black criminals and 
thereby to stereotype blacks as criminals.
64
 
Note that the foregoing mechanism depends on the preexisting social 
history and construction of racial categories. Even though redheads are 
rarer than non-redheads, we don’t remember redhead crime and implicitly 
associate redheads with criminality. The most obvious reason to suppose 
that this is the case is that race is salient, and hair color is not, due to our 
social practice of organizing the population along racial lines. Put 
 
 
 62. Bodenhausen & Richeson, supra note 51, at 349–50; David L. Hamilton & Robert K. 
Gifford, Illusory Correlation in Interpersonal Perception: A Cognitive Basis of Stereotypic Judgments, 
12 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 392 (1976); Brian Mullen & Craig Johnson, Distinctiveness-
Based Illusory Correlations and Stereotyping: A Meta-Analytic Integration, 29 BRIT. J. SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 11 (1990). Bodenhausen and Richeson note that this line of research “has been the subject 
of controversy.” Bodenhausen & Richeson, supra note 51, at 351. Further details are discussed, and 
more of the literature is reviewed, in James L. Hilton & William von Hippel, Stereotypes, 47 ANN. 
REV. PSYCHOL. 237, 245–47 (1996). Consistent with the salience of blackness underlying the idea of 
illusory correlation, in at least one study black primes were noticeably better at inducing stereotyping 
responses than white primes. Kerry Kawakami & John F. Dovidio, The Reliability of Implicit 
Stereotyping, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 212, 222–23 (2001). 
 63. Hilton & von Hippel, supra note 62, at 245–47.  
 64. Generally, illusory correlation effects are stronger when the observed behavior is negative, 
plausibly because negative behavior is more salient. Mullen & Johnson, supra note 62, at 13, 21, 24. 
Moreover, representations of black crime in the news seem to generate an unusually strong effect, 
particularly among those who subscribe to the stereotype of black crime—such citizens seem to 
become particularly concerned about crime, and they appear particularly likely to give character-based 
explanations for crime when exposed to information about black criminals. Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr. et 
al., Crime in Black and White: The Violent, Scary World of Local News, INT’L J. PRESS/POL., June 
1996, at 6, 18–19. 
 Let us not be ahistorical: scholars described similar ideas before the Great Depression. For 
example, one early sociologist pointed out the unusual salience of black criminals in the following 
terms: “The press is almost certain to brand him . . . [i]n setting the hall-mark of his color upon him, 
his individuality is in a sense submerged, and instead of a mere thief, robber, or murderer, he becomes 
a representative of his race . . . .” Thorsten Sellin, The Negro Criminal: A Statistical Note, 140 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 52, 52 (1928), quoted in KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE 
CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME AND THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA 2 
(2011).  
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differently, the socially constructed concept of race with the strong social 
salience that it carries leads people to remember crimes and other 
disapproved behaviors by members of minority races. This reinforces the 
hierarchical subordination of those races.
65
 Moreover, once a stereotype is 
established, those holding it are more likely to believe information 
consistent with it, rather than inconsistent with it—racial stereotyping 
makes hierarchical race a self-perpetuating category.
66
 
Let us examine the details. Stereotypes can alter the evaluation of 
evidence in a courtroom.
67
 Stereotypes can impair the performance of 
stereotyped groups due to anxiety associated with fear of confirming the 
stereotype. This is the famous “stereotype threat” that leads blacks to 
perform worse on tests “described as diagnostic of intelligence.”68 (Some 
psychologists suggest that blacks internalize negative stigmas to the extent 
of exhibiting “outgroup favoritism,” rather than the more usual “ingroup 
favoritism.”)69  
In one study, experimental subjects were exposed to rude behavior 
from a black person, triggering the stereotype of blacks as hostile. Not 
only did they avoid future interactions with blacks, the association 
between hostile behavior and blackness was so strong that experimental 
subjects exposed to hostile behavior from whites showed a subsequent 
greater propensity to avoid blacks, although this latter result was 
insignificant.
70
 In an even more striking result, nonblack subjects who 
were merely asked to think about people with stereotypically black names 
performed worse on academic tests.
71
 
 
 
 65. More on this phenomenon in Part III.A. 
 66. Hilton & von Hippel, supra note 62, at 252. See generally Raymond S. Nickerson, 
Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998) 
(describing general tendency of humans to attend more to information confirming prior beliefs). 
 67. Bodenhausen & Richeson, supra note 51, at 351. 
 68. Id. at 358–59. See also Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the 
Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797 (1995) 
(giving experimental evidence for stereotype threat); Thierry Devos & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit 
Self and Identity, 1001 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 177 (2003) (summarizing research on the influence 
of social categories on self-perception). 
 69. Bodenhausen & Richson, supra note 51, at 360.  
 70. Eaaron I. Henderson-King & Richard E. Nisbett, Anti-Black Prejudice as a Function of 
Exposure to the Negative Behavior of a Single Black Person, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
654, 655–58 (1996). In another study, experimental subjects subliminally exposed to a black face even 
showed greater anger in response to a computer crash—and this was true regardless of the subject’s 
explicit prejudice. John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait 
Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230, 238–39 
(1996). 
 71. S. Christian Wheeler et al., Think unto Others: The Self-Destructive Impact of Negative 
Racial Stereotypes, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 173, 179 (2001). 
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Economist Glenn Loury has developed fundamental insights into the 
nature of self-reinforcing stereotypes.
72
 Often treating someone 
(consciously or unconsciously) as if they have a characteristic generates its 
own evidence. Thus, lending discrimination against blacks based on the 
belief that they are more likely to default becomes self-fulfilling, because 
it makes loans more costly for the victims of discrimination, and people, 
regardless of their race, are more likely to find themselves unable to pay 
more costly loans.
73
 This will provide confirmatory information for 
stereotype-holders and reinforce the stereotype. Loury has aptly described 
the system of self-reinforcing stereotypes and attitudes attached to race as 
“racial stigma,” and notes a startling consequence: substantial percentages 
of all other races, when surveyed, “envisioned their ideal neighborhood, in 
which they would feel most comfortable, as one containing no blacks.”74 
As that last remark suggests, stereotyping exacerbates the residential 
segregation discussed at length in the next Part.
75
 Black neighborhoods are 
perceived as having more crime, independent of their actual crime rate, 
and whites have more inflated estimates of crime in black neighborhoods 
than do blacks.
76
 This gives whites “rational” (from their distorted 
epistemic standpoints) reason to avoid or flee from black communities. 
Racial stigma can be applied at the neighborhood level as well as at the 
individual level.
77
 
Now let us consider implicit attitudinal bias. Negative attitudes about 
blacks and positive attitudes about whites surface in response-time word-
association tests of implicit attitudes. These results have reappeared many 
times, with increasingly sophisticated experimental methods.
78
 The most 
modern method, the Implicit Association Test (“IAT”), has yielded 
consistent results in which subjects associate not only white and black 
names, but also white and black faces, with, respectively, positive and 
 
 
 72. GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 17–54 (2002). 
 73. Id. at 25, 29–33 (giving this and similar examples). 
 74. Glenn C. Loury, Racial Stigma and Its Consequences, FOCUS, Fall 2005, at 1, 2 (40% of 
Asians, 32% of Latinos, and 19% of whites). See also Glenn C. Loury, The Anatomy of Racial 
Inequality: The Author’s Account, REV. BLACK POL. ECON., Fall 2004, at 75, 79 (explaining concept 
of stigma).  
 75. See generally Elizabeth Brondolo et al., Racism and Social Capital: The Implications for 
Social and Physical Well-Being, 68 J. SOC. ISSUES 358 (2012) (explaining role of racial attitudes in 
social isolation of stigmatized racial groups). 
 76. Lincoln Quillian & Devah Pager, Black Neighbors, Higher Crime?: The Role of Racial 
Stereotypes in Evaluations of Neighborhood Crime, 107 AM. J. SOC. 717, 718–19 (2001). 
 77. Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Neighborhood Stigma and the Perception of 
Disorder, FOCUS, Fall 2005, at 7, 7–8. 
 78. See the literature reviewed by Jack Glaser & Christopher Finn, How and Why Implicit 
Attitudes Should Affect Voting, 46 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 537, 538–39 (2013). 
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negative words.
79
 Moreover, measured implicit racism leaks out in 
observable behavior: it is associated with perceived friendliness or 
unfriendliness of nonverbal interactions.
80
 These implicit attitudes are also 
associated with hasty judgments of blacks. In one study, subjects took less 
time to evaluate black than white people, and this difference was 
associated not only with measured implicit prejudice, but also with explicit 
prejudice and with the tendency to see blacks as homogeneous and 
interchangeable.
81
  
A prominent model for understanding implicit attitudinal bias is 
“aversive racism,” according to which a person’s conscious or surface 
beliefs support racial equality, but, when the implications of this belief 
system are not salient, “automatic activation” of lingering racist beliefs 
leads to discriminatory behavior.
82
 Paradoxically, even conscious attempts 
to avoid such behavior can make matters worse: the cognitive effort to 
overcome racial attitudes can cause whites to avoid interactions with 
blacks or exhibit less friendly behavior toward them.
83
 Aversive racists 
have, as the name suggests, aversive attitudes (often unconsciously), such 
as fear and discomfort, toward black people, while at the same time having 
aversive attitudes toward being characterized as racist.
84
 Aversive racist 
attitudes emerge in individuals’ behavior primarily when the racial 
implications of their behavior are not obvious, even to themselves.
85
 Thus, 
such racial attitudes can be manifested, inter alia, in employment decisions 
in the “grey area” of ambiguous qualifications evaluations,86 and where 
subjects had previously affirmed egalitarian views and thus could more 
easily preserve their self-image as non-racist.
87
  
 
 
 79. Nilanjana Dasgupta et al., Automatic Preference for White Americans: Eliminating the 
Familiarity Explanation, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 316, 321–22 (2000).  
 80. John F. Dovidio et al., Implicit and Explicit Prejudice and Interracial Interaction, 82 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 62 (2002). 
 81. Jorge Vala et al., Intergroup Time Bias and Racialized Social Relations, 38 PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 491, 493 (2012). As the authors point out, swift evaluation is exactly what 
“prejudice” means. It is plausible to suppose that these hasty judgments facilitate the application of 
stereotypes: many psychologists accept the “dual process” model of cognition according to which 
hasty judgments are characterized by lazy cognitive shortcuts and heuristics. See generally DANIEL 
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).  
 82. Bodenhausen & Richeson, supra note 51, at 348.  
 83. Id. at 363–64. See also Jennifer A. Richeson & Sophie Trawalter, The Threat of Appearing 
Prejudiced and Race-Based Attentional Biases, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 98 (2008) (offering neuroscientific 
evidence in support of the aversive model). 
 84. Adam R. Pearson et al., The Nature of Contemporary Prejudice: Insights from Aversive 
Racism, 3 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 314, 316–17 (2009). 
 85. Id. at 318. 
 86. Id. at 319–20. 
 87. Id. at 326. 
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Implicitly racist attitudes may also be activated by coded racial 
appeals, which may or may not be intended by the speaker. For example, 
Tali Mendelberg’s research on coded racial messages in political 
campaigns suggested that referring to social practices stereotypically 
associated with race, like welfare receipt, in conjunction with pictures of 
blacks, led subjects to prefer policies reflecting previously measured 
“racial resentment,” even though subjects did not consciously recognize 
the racial implications of the conjunction of pictures and stereotype.
88
 
There is substantial evidence that implicit racially biased attitudes are 
associated with real-world discriminatory behavior.
89
 Perhaps their most 
severe manifestation (and that of stereotypes as well) is in the criminal 
justice system.
90
 When data have been collected, police overwhelmingly 
have been shown to target blacks.
91
 This targeting is ineffective: the “hit” 
rate—the rate at which investigating someone yields evidence of a 
crime—is higher for whites, indicating that blacks are being targeted with 
less reason to suspect their involvement in crime than are whites.
92
 
Highlighting the criminal justice effect of implicit bias, psychologists 
have shown that subjects are more likely to identify held objects as guns 
rather than tools when the holder is black.
93
 The mere fact of attention to 
 
 
 88. TALI MENDELBERG, THE RACE CARD: CAMPAIGN STRATEGY, IMPLICIT MESSAGES, AND THE 
NORM OF EQUALITY 193–203 (2001). See also Ann Cammett, Deadbeat Dads & Welfare Queens: 
How Metaphor Shapes Poverty Law, 34 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 233 (2014) (analyzing how these racial 
appeals arise from historical stereotypes and become “conceptual metaphors” that influence individual 
perceptions as well as social policy). 
 89. See Justine E. Tinkler, Controversies in Implicit Race Bias Research, 6 SOC. COMPASS 987, 
992–93 (2012) (citing evidence for voting, employment discrimination, generosity, medical treatment, 
and other social interactions). 
 90. See Michael R. Smith & Geoffrey P. Alpert, Explaining Police Bias: A Theory of Social 
Conditioning and Illusory Correlation, 34 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1262 (2007) (giving an account of 
biased policing rooted in the theory of illusory correlation). See generally L. Song Richardson & 
Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion Heuristic, 98 IOWA L. REV. 293, 296–97 (2012) 
(reviewing implicit bias literature and its implications for racially disparate criminal justice, in the 
context of “self-defense” claims such as those at issue in the Trayvon Martin shooting); L. Song 
Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2037–41 (2011) 
(describing implications for police decisions to stop, search, and seize).  
 91. David A. Harris, The Reality of Racial Disparity in Criminal Justice: The Significance of 
Data Collection, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2003, at 71, 77–78 (“In Maryland, for example, 
where the driving population on the relevant highway was seventeen percent black, blacks made up 
over seventy percent of all of those stopped and searched.”); id. at 96 (In New Jersey, “[b]lacks made 
up fifty-three percent of all those drivers subjected to consent searches; Latinos were twenty-five 
percent, while whites were only nineteen percent.”). See also PERRY, supra note 48, at 104 (recounting 
further evidence of racial profiling). 
 92. Harris, supra note 91 at 82, 96 (rates for stops and searches). 
 93. See literature reviewed in Christopher R. Jones & Russell H. Fazio, Person Categorization 
and Automatic Racial Stereotyping Effects on Weapon Identification, 36 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1073, 1075 (2010). See also Joshua Correll et al., The Influence of Stereotypes on 
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race yields this outcome, and diverting attention to dimensions of 
categorization other than race ameliorates it.
94
 Indeed, even asking 
subjects to think about race in order to consciously ignore its effects 
increased this weapon bias.
95
  
Nor are judges free from implicit bias, although the ideal of judicial 
impartiality may lead them to attempt to compensate for it.
96
 These biases 
also distort the criminal justice policies endorsed by the democratic 
process. In one recent study, whites who were led to believe that the prison 
population was more predominantly black showed both a greater fear of 
crime and a higher level of support for aggressive policing and harshly 
punitive sentencing.
97
 
There is also some psychological evidence on implicit attitudinal bias 
that directly implicates the hierarchical nature of racial categories. Whites 
have been shown to express stronger negative attitudes toward “strongly 
identified” nonwhites than to “weakly identified” nonwhites, and, 
strikingly, the intensity of negative attitudes was positively associated with 
endorsing social hierarchies in general.
98
 The authors of this study 
interpret their evidence as suggesting that members of subordinated racial 
groups who more greatly emphasize their association with those groups 
are perceived to pose a threat to existing status hierarchies, thus leading 
 
 
Decisions to Shoot, 37 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1102, 1104–07 (2007) (finding exposure to news stories 
about black criminals increased propensity to shoot blacks rather than whites in shooter judgment 
simulation). But see Lois James et al., Results from Experimental Trials Testing Participant Responses 
to White, Hispanic and Black Suspects in High-Fidelity Deadly Force Judgment and Decision-Making 
Simulations, 9 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 189, 189 (2013) (finding contrary result suggesting 
lesser police readiness to shoot blacks than other suspects). Evidently, the research in this area is not 
totally conclusive. Additional insight may be gleaned from another finding, suggesting that police took 
longer to decide whether to shoot black suspects, and did not display shooter bias, though civilians did 
more readily shoot blacks. Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial 
Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006 (2007). Perhaps these results 
can be reconciled by hypothesizing that police officers and civilians are subject to the same implicit 
racial bias in weapon perception, but that police training allows them to pause and reconsider before 
reflexively shooting—at least in low stakes environments like the lab. (Judging by the recent spate of 
police shootings of unarmed black men in the news, it is hard to believe that any such police training 
effect applies on the streets, but, of course, such an intuition does not constitute evidence.) 
 94. Jones & Fazio, supra note 93, at 1083. 
 95. B. Keith Payne et al., Best Laid Plans: Effects of Goals on Accessibility Bias and Cognitive 
Control in Race-Based Misperceptions of Weapons, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 384, 394–95 
(2002). 
 96. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1195, 1197 (2009). 
 97. Rebecca C. Hetey & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Racial Disparities in Incarceration Increase 
Acceptance of Punitive Policies, 25 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1949, 1950–51 (2014). 
 98. Cheryl R. Kaiser & Jennifer S. Pratt-Hyatt, Distributing Prejudice Unequally: Do Whites 
Direct Their Prejudice Toward Strongly Identified Minorities?, 96 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
432, 432–34 (2009). 
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whites invested in those hierarchies to defend them by adopting negative 
attitudes toward the subordinated groups.
99
 The threat that confident 
nonwhite racial identity poses to the comfortable enjoyment by whites of 
status hierarchy is strong evidence that the normative behavior of 
nonwhites is to be ashamed of their racial ascription. That is, the social 
meaning of race is closely tied to status. That interpretive idea is the 
subject of the next two subparts. 
B. Race on the Perceptual Level 
The group-level version of the claim that third-person racial 
classifications are infected with status hierarchies is not the complete 
picture of racial hierarchy. For some surprising sociological and 
psychological research suggests that even on the individual level, 
perceptions of race depend on social status, and perceiving nonracial 
social-status information changes perceived race information. 
First, the groundbreaking research of Aliya Saperstein, Andrew Penner, 
and their co-authors shows that both self-identification and racial identities 
ascribed by others vary with social status over a wide array of life settings 
and over a period of time ranging at least from the Jim Crow era to the 
present. People who are poor, unemployed, dead from violence, or 
incarcerated are more likely to identify as black and be identified by others 
as black. And this is not only a group-level phenomenon: a single 
individual can switch races after a status change.
100
 
 
 
 99. Id. at 442. See also Jennifer A. Richeson & Nalini Ambady, Effects of Situational Power on 
Automatic Racial Prejudice, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 177, 181–83 (2003) (whites who 
had been placed in a situationally superior role to a black person showed more racist attitudes on IAT); 
Maureen A. Craig & Jennifer A. Richeson, On the Precipice of a “Majority-Minority” America: 
Perceived Status Threat from the Racial Demographic Shift Affects White Americans’ Political 
Ideology, 25 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1189, 1190–91 (2014) (reporting experimental results suggesting that 
demographic shifts toward greater proportion of nonwhites caused white subjects to endorse more 
conservative policy positions); Edward A. Ho et al., The Effects of Comparative Status on Social 
Stereotypes: How the Perceived Success of Some Persons Affects the Stereotypes of Others, 20 SOC. 
COGNITION 36, 41–45 (2002) (when experimental subjects were exposed to “Horatio Alger” individual 
success stories, they adopted more negative stereotypical views of blacks). This last result can be 
interpreted as motivated cognition in defense of a system that provides high status to whites, since it 
allowed subjects to blame black disadvantage on individual rather than social factors.  
 100. Aliya Saperstein & Andrew M. Penner, Racial Fluidity and Inequality in the United States, 
118 AM. J. SOC. 676, 698–700 (2012) (finding, inter alia, that Americans who lose their jobs, are 
incarcerated, or are on welfare are more likely thereafter to be classified by survey interviewers as 
black even if they were previously classified as white); Aliya Saperstein & Aaron Gullickson, A 
“Mulatto Escape Hatch” in the United States? Examining Evidence of Racial and Social Mobility 
During the Jim Crow Era, 50 DEMOGRAPHY 1921, 1921–22 (2013) (finding that nineteenth century 
census takers were more likely to classify an individual as mulatto who had previously been classified 
as black when that individual had an improved occupational status, and vice versa); Jonathan B. 
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This sociological evidence is matched by psychological evidence. In 
the lab, observers’ own biases were shown to influence categorization 
attempts. Subjects who exhibited implicit affective bias were more likely 
to categorize hostile-appearing faces as black.
101
 In another study, 
participants more accurately remembered black faces when those faces 
were presented as angry.
102
 In still another study, white subjects had more 
difficulty—i.e., they took more time—identifying famous people whom 
they admired as black.
103
 Reading these studies together, subjects seem to 
have a much easier time ascribing blackness to individuals with negative 
and low-status qualities than to individuals with positive and high-status 
qualities. 
It is also matched by neurological evidence. In one study, subjects who 
exhibited more evidence of negative implicit attitudes toward blacks also 
exhibited greater differences in some neurological activation patterns 
when beginning operations associated with face recognition.
104
 That 
study’s authors interpret this result to “suggest that implicit race 
 
 
Freeman et al., Looking the Part: Social Status Cues Shape Race Perception, 6 PLOS ONE e25107 
(2011) (finding that experimental subjects were more likely to identify a picture of the same individual 
as black when janitorial clothes were worn, and as white when business clothes were worn); Andrew 
Noymer et al., Cause of Death Affects Racial Classification on Death Certificates, 6 PLOS ONE 
e15812 (2011) (finding that stereotypical black and Native American causes of death make those racial 
identifications more likely); Aliya Saperstein & Andrew M. Penner, The Race of a Criminal Record: 
How Incarceration Colors Racial Perceptions, 57 SOC. PROBS. 92, 103–10 (2010) (finding that black 
self-identification as well as other-identification is more likely after incarceration); Andrew M. Penner 
& Aliya Saperstein, How Social Status Shapes Race, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 19628, 19628 
(2008) (similar results for incarceration, unemployment, and poverty). 
 101. Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Ambiguity in Social Categorization: The Role of 
Prejudice and Facial Affect in Race Categorization, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 342, 342 (2004). See also Paul 
B. Hutchings & Geoffrey Haddock, Look Black in Anger: The Role of Implicit Prejudice in the 
Categorization and Perceived Emotional Intensity of Racially Ambiguous Faces, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1418, 1418 (2008) (extending Hugenberg & Bodehnausen’s result to show that 
subjects with more implicit bias were more likely to interpret hostile faces as black, and more likely to 
interpret angry black-categorized faces as more angry than angry white-categorized faces). 
 102. Joshua M. Ackerman et al., They All Look the Same to Me (Unless They’re Angry): From 
Out-Group Homogeneity to Out-Group Heterogeneity, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 836, 836 (2006). In 
describing all of this research, the statement that subjects, saw, remembered, etc. a face of a given race 
should be understood to mean that they saw, remembered, etc. a face that had been identified with that 
race by either themselves or the researcher. 
 103. Jennifer A. Richeson & Sophie Trawalter, On the Categorization of Admired and Disliked 
Exemplars of Admired and Disliked Racial Groups, 89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 517, 527 
(2005). 
 104. Yi He et al., The Relation Between Race-Related Implicit Associations and Scalp-Recorded 
Neural Activity Evoked by Faces from Different Races, 4 SOC. NEUROSCI. 426, 437–40 (2009). See 
also Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 881–88 (2004) (reporting results of studies in which subjects 
focused attention more readily on black faces after being primed with both negative and positive 
stereotyped black traits). 
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associations influence the neural processing of faces almost immediately 
after identification.”105  
Another neuroscientific study revealed that subjects categorized faces 
as black or white faster when presented with those faces in conjunction 
with words reflecting stereotypes associated with those racial 
classifications.
106
 The words for whites were “smart, rich, success, scholar, 
educate, wealth, honest, bright, safe, truth, loyal, [and] kind”; for blacks, 
“stupid, poor, messy, violent, lazy, danger, threat, rude, loud, harm, 
deceive, [and] crime.”107 This study suggests that the use of racial 
stereotypes and status classifications is built into our ability to classify 
faces as white or black in the first place. Interpreting that study with an 
awareness of the contingency of racial classifications to status, as in the 
Saperstein/Penner research, suggests that participants classified the faces 
as white or black in part because of their association with stereotyped 
content with high or low status valence, respectively.  
In another recent study, attentional patterns of white subjects to faces 
designed to be racially ambiguous were affected by such racial 
stereotypes. Without stereotypic primes, the subjects paid more attention 
(as measured by EEG data) to black faces than to white or (researcher-
classified) racially ambiguous faces; when stereotypic primes were given, 
the subjects paid more attention to the racially ambiguous faces as well.
108
 
In the context of the previously noted results, this suggests that the 
 
 
 105. He et al., supra note 104, at 438. See also William A. Cunningham et al., Separable Neural 
Components in the Processing of Black and White Faces, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 806, 806 (2004) (more 
negative attitudes toward blacks correlated with amygdala response, associated with emotional arousal, 
to black faces after only 30 milliseconds of exposure); Renana H. Ofan et al., Seeing Race: N170 
Responses to Race and Their Relation to Automatic Racial Attitudes and Controlled Processing, 23 J. 
COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 3153, 3158–60 (2011) (subjects with more implicit bias showed stronger 
electrical responses in systems associated with facial encoding when exposed to black faces, which the 
authors interpret as suggesting that processing non-normative faces imposes greater cognitive 
demands). 
 106. Bruce D. Bartholow & Cheryl L. Dickter, A Response Conflict Account of the Effects of 
Stereotypes on Racial Categorization, 26 SOC. COGNITION 314, 314 (2008). 
 107. Id. at 318 (italicized in the original). 
 108. Cheryl L. Dickter & Julie A. Kittel, The Effect of Stereotypical Primes on the Neural 
Processing of Racially Ambiguous Faces, 7 SOC. NEUROSCI. 622, 622 (2012). The priming treatment 
in this study was carried out first by surveying a separate pool of subjects to determine the words they 
associated with blackness and whiteness, and then those were briefly displayed to the main experiment 
subjects before the pictures to which their response was measured. Id. at 624–25. See also Virginia A. 
Newton et al., The Effects of Stereotypical Cues on the Social Categorization and Judgment of 
Ambiguous-Race Targets, 4 J. INTERPERSONAL REL. INTERGROUP REL. & IDENTITY 31, 39–42 (2011) 
(similarly constructed ambiguous-race faces tended to be identified as black when presented with 
stereotypically black names and personal traits, white otherwise). 
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stereotype primes led the subjects to entertain the possibility that the 
ambiguous faces were black. 
In another study, subjects were shown videos of subjects accused of 
crimes stereotypically associated with either blacks or whites and then 
asked to identify the perpetrator from a photograph.
109
 When the crime 
was stereotypically black, the subjects identified mugshots with more 
stereotypically black physical features, regardless of the actual video; 
when the crime was stereotypically white, they identified mugshots with 
more stereotypically white features.
110
 In other words, subjects 
misremembered the putatively objective racial characteristics of the faces 
they saw once they had been exposed to behavior consistent with racial 
stereotypes.  
In the most recent study, subjects were subliminally primed with either 
“educated” or “ignorant,” then asked to remember the faces they had 
seen.
111
 Those who were primed with “educated” remembered lighter 
faces.
112
  
What are we to make of these results? The cognitive hierarchical model 
suggests that individual observers apply hierarchical status evaluations in 
order to ascribe racial identities to other individuals. To identify someone 
as “black” or “white” is to assign that person a status, a place in a social 
hierarchy. This theoretical innovation is described in the next subpart.  
Before turning to that material, however, let us note that status 
hierarchies are not the only social factors that feed into our racial 
ascriptions. Observers’ general attitudes toward race affect the way they 
carry out the cognitive task in the first place. For example, in one study, 
those subjects who scored higher on a scale of explicit racism took more 
time, and gave more indications of effort, when asked to categorize 
 
 
 109. Danny Osborne & Paul G. Davies, Eyewitness Identifications Are Affected by Stereotypes 
About a Suspect’s Level of Perceived Stereotypicality, 16 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 488, 
488 (2013). Again, stereotypes were elicited by a preliminary survey. Id. at 491. For blacks, they were 
“drive-by shooting, gang-related beating, pimp, carjacking, cop killer, and street gambling,” for 
whites, “internet hacker, insider trading, hate crime, identity theft, embezzlement, and serial killer.” Id. 
at 502.  
 110. Id. at 493–97. The authors also found similar results using slightly different experimental 
methods. 
 111. Avi Ben-Zeev et al., When an “Educated” Black Man Becomes Lighter in the Mind’s Eye: 
Evidence for a Skin Tone Memory Bias, SAGE OPEN, Jan.–Mar. 2014, at 1, 3–5, available at 
http://sgo.sagepub.com/content/4/1/2158244013516770.full-text.pdf+html. I thank Vero Smith for 
bringing this result to my attention. Even within racial groups, there is reason to believe that lighter 
skin tone means higher status. See generally COLOR MATTERS, supra note 7. 
 112. Ben-Zeev et al., supra note 111, at 7. 
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racially ambiguous faces.
113
 In another study, short-term resource 
constraints appeared to affect how subjects saw race and what they did 
with it: when confronted with scarcity-related primes observers were more 
likely to perceive faces they encountered as black, and when confronted 
with actual economic scarcity they were more likely to assign blackness to 
more stereotypically black and darker-skinned faces.
114
 Subjects allocated 
fewer resources to the faces with the more stereotypically black traits, and 
subjects who endorsed the belief that blacks and whites were in direct 
economic competition were more likely than those who did not endorse 
that belief to categorize ambiguous faces as black.
115
 
Moreover, once a racial category is assigned, that assignment guides 
further perceptions. For example, even perceived physical characteristics 
can vary depending on ascribed racial categories. One study showed that 
otherwise identical faces, once given stereotypically black hairstyles, were 
perceived to have other stereotypically black physical traits, such as a 
“darker complexion.”116  
Some of the science itself may be problematic on its own terms. Many 
of the studies described in this Part seem to have been based on the 
assumption that researchers could themselves categorize faces by race 
based on visual observation alone—to identify, for example, which faces 
were “actually” white, or black, or racially ambiguous—and some even 
removed experimental subjects’ classifications which they viewed as 
erroneous.
117
 That they could even do this in the course of experimentally 
demonstrating the malleability of visual racial classification is a 
 
 
 113. Jim Blascovich et al., Racism and Racial Categorization, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1364, 1364 (1997). 
 114. Amy R. Krosch & David M. Amodio, Economic Scarcity Alters the Perception of Race, 111 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9079, 9082 (2014).  
 115. Id. That last finding is consistent with the “opportunity hoarding” explanation for racial 
discrimination discussed by ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF INTEGRATION 7–8 (2010), 
according to which in-groups prefer their own members for social and economic resources. Another 
excellent account of opportunity hoarding, in more explicitly economic terms, is Daria Roithmayr, 
Racial Cartels, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 45 (2010). Overall, the Krosch & Amodio research suggests 
that people are more likely to categorize others into racial out-groups when doing so facilitates in-
group control of scarce resources. 
 116. Otto H. MacLin & Roy S. Malpass, The Ambiguous-Race Face Illusion, 32 PERCEPTION 249, 
250 (2003).  
 117. For example, Bartholow & Dickter, supra note 106, at 319, 322, removed “incorrect” results. 
One paper reviewed many of the results noted in Part II.B, and then said the following: “Of course, 
many individuals appear to be ambiguous with respect to traditional racial or ethnic groups because 
they are in fact multiracial.” Galen V. Bodenhausen & Destiny Peery, Social Categorization and 
Stereotyping In Vivo: The VUCA Challenge, 3 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 133, 144 
(2009). To the contrary, the research described here suggests that there is no objective “in fact” 
multiraciality.  
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paradigmatic case of the theory-ladenness of observation: the theoretical 
implication of their own work indicates that their own pre-experimental 
acts of racial classification may be socially contingent as well as 
unstable.
118
 However, the demonstrated behavior by experimental subjects 
nonetheless reveals the status contingency of racial categorization even on 
less than ideal experimental designs. 
The upshot of all of this research is that racial ascriptions are 
influenced by many factors other than visual and cultural references like 
skin color and hairstyle. While doubtless those factors also feed into racial 
ascriptions, those ascriptions can vary with a variety of facts, most 
importantly including the hierarchical social status of the observed, but 
also including the observer’s racial attitudes and short-term influences on 
the observer. 
C. The Cognitive Hierarchical Model 
The research reviewed in the last Subpart suggests the possibility of an 
advance on previous social constructionist accounts of race, which we may 
call the cognitive hierarchical model of race. Its main distinction is that it 
specifies the way that hierarchy functions on an individual as well as a 
group level in our operation of racial concepts. 
The cognitive hierarchical model adds to the group-level claim the idea 
that Americans apply social hierarchy to race at the level of perception. To 
perceive someone as of a given race is to perceive his or her place in a 
social hierarchy. Put differently, judgments of hierarchical status are 
inextricable from racial ascriptions: to carry out the second cognitive 
operation is always to do the first.
119
 Status judgments cause racial 
ascriptions, as racial ascriptions cause status judgments, on an individual-
by-individual basis. In Obasogie’s terms, this contributes to a 
“constitutive” account of race, one that moves beyond social 
 
 
 118. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 126–30 (3d ed. 1996) 
(describing contingency of our observational categories on preexisting theoretical paradigms). See 
generally Jim Bogen, Theory and Observation in Science, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (last updated 
Jan. 11, 2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/science-theory-observation/ (explaining 
concept of theory-ladenness). 
 119. This is a step beyond the previous state-of-the-art incorporation of the mind sciences research 
into the legal literature, that of Kang, supra note 56. Kang borrows from the racial schema framework 
to suggest that attitudes about race are activated when races are recognized, even unconsciously. Id. at 
1499–1504. The cognitive hierarchical model concludes that, contrary to what Kang appears to have 
been assuming, the schema works both ways. Racial classification doesn’t just influence attitudes; 
status-linked attitudes also influence racial classification. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
354 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:325 
 
 
 
 
constructionism to reveal how our social categories seep directly down 
into individual behavior and cognition.
120
 
The cognitive hierarchical model makes bolder claims than the group-
level account. The group account is compatible with the notion that some 
individuals can be assigned to a subordinate or superordinate race without 
being assigned to subordinate or superordinate status. For that reason, the 
group account is arguably consistent with the implicit presupposition, built 
into the standing cases discussed in Parts I.B and IV.C, that individual 
members of a subordinated race might not suffer personal injury from their 
racial subordination.
121
 The cognitive hierarchical model calls that notion 
into question. It suggests that each person with a stigmatized racial 
identity suffers a direct and individual blow to his or her social status. This 
is the heart of ascriptive injury.  
Here, I propose to complete the model by drawing a connection 
between the way American language-users use a term like “black” and 
what we mean by it. Stated that way, it sounds as if I am about to utter a 
trivial banality: of course linguistic meaning has something to do with the 
way words are used. But actually, the philosophical claim that use 
constitutes linguistic meaning is debatable.
122
  
Rather than take on controversial positions in philosophy of language, 
for purposes of understanding the Equal Protection implications of racial 
hierarchy, we can rely on a more prosaic observation. Regardless of 
whether linguistic meaning is constituted by use or not, the way people use 
words certainly counts as evidence of what they mean by them and what 
they understand them to entail. And the evidence suggests that many 
people in America seem to equate blackness to a cluster of low-status 
traits such as poverty and criminality. This is what I mean by ascriptive 
injury: the notion that blackness is worth less than whiteness seems to be 
built into the American psyche.  
On the expressive conception of Equal Protection, to be discussed in 
Part IV, the state is forbidden to reinforce such ascriptive injuries with the 
law—the state may not enact laws that express or reinforce the 
 
 
 120. OSAGIE K. OBASOGIE, BLINDED BY SIGHT: SEEING RACE THROUGH THE EYES OF THE BLIND 
18 (2014). 
 121. See HASLANGER, supra note 2, at 237 n.17 (“[M]embers of racial groups may be scattered 
across social contexts and may not all actually be (immediately) affected by local structures of 
privilege and subordination.”). 
 122. For a use-based theory of linguistic meaning, see Paul Horwich, Implicit Definition, Analytic 
Truth, and Apriori Knowledge, 31 NOÛS 423, 424 (1997). For a picture of the debate, see Jeff Speaks, 
Theories of Meaning, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (last updated Apr. 23, 2014), http://plato.stanford. 
edu/entries/meaning/.  
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psychological and sociological association of blackness with badness, for 
to do so cannot be justified by any principle that takes blacks and whites to 
be equals. Most of the remainder of this Article is devoted to arguing that 
the American governments violate this conception of Equal Protection. 
If we do take on stronger philosophical claims about use-based 
linguistic meaning, an even stronger claim about ascriptive injury is 
available (though no such claim is necessary for the constitutional 
argument in this Article). Consider Barack Obama. On the evidence 
presented in Part II.A alone, to say he is identified as black is to signify 
that if we knew nothing else about him, he would be more likely than 
someone who was identified as white to be poor, to be suspected of 
crimes, to be viewed as lazy or violent. But we do know other things about 
him—we know that he is a graduate of Columbia and Harvard, and, of 
course, that he is President of the United States, and such individual 
information is likely to swamp the probabilistic information about the 
consequences of his race, such as the stereotypes that would otherwise be 
likely to be attributed to him. It seems highly unlikely that many people 
think Barack Obama is on welfare or liable to commit a carjacking.
123
 
However, the evidence presented in Part II.B suggests that President 
Obama is nonetheless harmed by the ascription “black.” The causal 
direction from perceived status to ascription matters for meaning: since 
people in American society (or, at least, those at the top of the American 
racial hierarchy, i.e. whites) ascribe blackness to people of subordinate 
status (that is, they use “black” to mean “subordinate”), and because of 
that subordinate status, there is a sense in which “X is black” in part means 
“X is of subordinate status.”  
Of course, such a claim is subject to caveats associated with the 
distinction between using a term and mentioning it. It is possible to 
employ the status content of a racial ascription either with or without 
implying the truth of that content. To say “X is black” might mean “X is in 
fact of low status,” or it might mean “X is attributed low status by others.” 
When President Obama identifies himself as black, as he did on the 2010 
census,
124
 his act of doing so is obviously not an insult to himself (except 
to the extent he has internalized racial stigma), but is in part an affirmation 
 
 
 123. That being said, even if Obama is free from racial stereotypes, he is not completely free from 
the consequences of attitudinal biases. Political scientists have found evidence that his approval 
ratings, as well as who endorses policy positions that become associated with the President, are 
influenced by citizens’ racial attitudes. See MICHAEL TESLER & DAVID O. SEARS, OBAMA’S RACE: 
THE 2008 ELECTION AND THE DREAM OF A POST-RACIAL AMERICA 142–59 (2010). 
 124. SpearIt, Why Obama is Black: Language, Law and Structures of Power, 1 COLUM. J. RACE & 
L. 468, 468 (2012). 
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of the fact that others have assigned him to low status relative even to an 
equivalent (counterfactual) white President.  
In contrast to the likely meaning of the President’s self-attribution, 
based on the evidence given in Part II.B, at least some language users in 
fact implicitly use blackness to mean actual low status. For those people, 
to say “President Obama is black” is to assign him to a social position of 
less esteem than he otherwise would hold—using a label to describe him 
that they otherwise tend to use to describe people who are, for example, in 
jail or on welfare. Accordingly, even the President suffers ascriptive injury 
on an individual basis from the association of blackness with badness, and 
he too would benefit from measures designed to ameliorate the social 
stigma of blackness, so that “black” no longer means “of low status” to 
anyone. To be clear, the solution is not to stop calling him black. The 
solution is to abolish the social basis for the stigmatic association of 
blackness with lowliness. For, on the individual-level account, every 
individual who is subject to a subordinated racial ascription experiences 
ascriptive injury. 
To further clarify, the group-level claim and the cognitive hierarchical 
model (individual-level claim) are both true. The cognitive hierarchical 
model is an addition to the group-level claim, and—the next Part argues—
causally depends on it. We draw on status hierarchies in classifying 
individuals within races because over hundreds of years our (American) 
racial categories have been constructed in hierarchical ways and have been 
used to reinforce those hierarchies in our broader culture. Our social 
hierarchies promote racial stereotypes and attitudinal biases, and those 
stereotypes and biases then leak into our basic perceptual processes to the 
point where we apply them on an individual level. Culture creates 
cognition. That phenomenon, and the joint responsibility of the state and 
private individuals for bringing it about, is the subject of the next Part. 
III. THE CAUSES OF HIERARCHICAL CLASSIFICATION 
This Part gives an account of the cultural, political, and legal causes of 
the social cognitions described in Part II. It sets the stage for Part IV, 
which argues that the state is continuing to support the causes of 
hierarchical racial classification with its laws, and then suggests the Equal 
Protection Clause be pressed into service to stop it. Part III.A gives the 
basic argument for the proposition that culture causes the cognitions 
described in the previous Part. Part III.B describes the historical 
construction of racial categories in the United States. Part III.C describes 
the continuing phenomenon of racial segregation and segregation-related 
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disadvantage as well as the joint responsibility of public and private actors 
for it. 
A. Perception and Culture 
Sociologists, historians, and other social scientists typically agree that 
race is a social construct, and have produced a vast literature 
demonstrating that racial categories change over time and location, 
depending on political, economic, and social forces.
125
 Philosophers and 
biologists generally agree (with a handful of exceptions) that races are not 
natural, and typically debate whether it is better to say that they are “social 
kinds” (a position roughly equivalent to the social constructionist view in 
social science) or to simply deny that they exist altogether.
126
  
Here, there is no need to enter into the conceptual debate. We can 
suppose, with Haslanger, that there is a biological category (“color”) upon 
which social facts (“race”) are overlaid or we can suppose that the social 
facts are all there are.
127
 For present purposes, however, we must maintain 
a sharp distinction between social and biological facts about race, and we 
must recognize that even visual perceptions are social. The evidence in 
Part II.B suggests that when we observe a face, our perception of the 
person’s race—which we commonly understand and describe as a 
perception of its skin hue, a physical fact—depends on social information. 
It depends on both social status information and on other visual 
information, such as hair type, which, on the American folk theory of race, 
is clustered with skin hue in a set of allegedly ancestral categories.  
The question thus arises: where did it come from? The status 
ascriptions we attach to racial categories cannot be natural because those 
racial categories vary across times and cultures. As Part III.B will 
describe, even our chief existing racial cleavage in the United States did 
not obviously exist until the start of the eighteenth century. Moreover, 
since then, American racial classifications have changed, as have the 
criteria for inclusion in those classifications.
128
 Worldwide, racial 
 
 
 125. See, e.g., MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
53–61 (2d ed. 1994) (giving social constructionist account of race). 
 126. See generally HASLANGER, supra note 2, at 299–300 (describing the extant positions). 
 127. See HASLANGER, supra note 2, at 307–08 (giving color/race distinction).  
 128. See, e.g., OMI & WINANT, supra note 125, at 82 (recounting initial classification of Chinese 
people in the U.S. as “Indian,” development of Latino classification in mid-twentieth century); Peter 
Kolchin, Whiteness Studies: The New History of Race in America, 89 J. AM. HIST. 154, 158 (2002) 
(quoting Benjamin Franklin’s strange-to-contemporary-ears classification of Saxons and English as 
white, Germans, Swedes, French, and Russians as nonwhite). See generally Jerry Kang, Implicit Bias 
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classifications have also changed in the face of cross-cultural interaction; 
perhaps the most egregious example is the warping of the categories 
“Hutu” and “Tutsi” by colonial powers to facilitate their rule in 
Rwanda.
129
  
The most plausible supposition is that the cognitive hierarchical model 
is a consequence of our social and cultural treatment of race. Psychologists 
have long known that culture shapes basic perceptual processes.
130
 Many 
of our cognitive functions are strongly culturally contingent.
131
 These 
include basic visual processing elements like the perception of line 
length.
132
 They also include natural kind groupings, such as the 
identification of which dimensions make up the stuff of basic 
categorization.
133
 These perceptual processes are obviously relevant to 
seeing race and describing it. Similarly, psychologists have observed that 
preexisting conceptual categories shape perceptual processes, even to the 
point of allowing people to be outright misled about what they report 
seeing. For example, people presented with an abnormal playing card (like 
a red spade) can erroneously report seeing a card that their preexisting 
conceptual categories suggest they ought to have seen (i.e. a black 
spade).
134
  
In view of the cultural and conceptual plasticity of the mind, this 
Article will operate with the working hypothesis (which cannot be 
validated except by focused scientific study) that we apply social hierarchy 
in our individual acts of racial perception and classification because 
 
 
and the Pushback from the Left, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1139, 1144 (2010) (explaining how “racial 
categories,” “racial mapping rules,” and “racial meanings” are all contingent and change over time). 
 129. Alison Des Forges, The Ideology of Genocide, 23 ISSUE: J. OPINION, no. 2, 1995 at 44, 44 
(describing European identification of Tutsi as superior racial category in view of alleged physical 
similarities to whites); Catharine Newbury, Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda, AFRICA 
TODAY, Jan. 1998, at 7 (describing contested terrain of Rwandan racial identity); Ulrike Kistner, 
Lineages of Racism in Genocidal Contexts—Lessons from Hannah Arendt in Contemporary African 
Genocide Scholarship, DEV. DIALOGUE, Dec. 2008, at 155, 159–61 (providing further detail on the 
classification system imported by Europeans into Rwanda). 
 130. See generally Paul DiMaggio, Culture and Cognition, 23 ANN. REV. SOC. 263, 269–70 
(1997) (summarizing research suggesting that people are better at perceiving and remembering 
information consistent with their “schemata”—culturally influenced “knowledge structures that 
represent objects or events and provide default assumptions about their characteristics, relationships, 
and entailments”). 
 131. See generally Joseph Henrich et al., The Weirdest People in the World, BEHAV. & BRAIN 
SCI., Mar. 2009, at 61, 64–78 (reviewing literature on cultural differences in basic cognitive 
processes).  
 132. Id. at 64 (discussing Muller-Lyer optical illusion about line length, to which Americans are 
more susceptible than people in other countries). 
 133. Id. at 67–68.  
 134. KUHN, supra note 118, at 62–64 (describing experiments reported in Jerome S. Bruner, & 
Leo Postman, On the Perception of Incongruity: A Paradigm, 18 J. PERSONALITY 206 (1949)). 
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cultural practices of racial stratification and subordination have seeped 
into our individual psychologies.
135
 Any other explanation for this 
evidence seems impossible: those things that we do, even at the 
neurological level, with categories that are unquestionably dependent on 
cultural facts—such as which features about people we find salient and 
how we draw the lines between groups at our current place in history—
must be in some sense causally influenced by the properties attributed to 
those groups in the culture. Perhaps evolution has wired a need to attend to 
social status directly into our brains, or perhaps that, too, is a product of 
our culture. This Article need not, and does not, take a position on the 
question. What we do know is that our culture has assigned statuses to 
races, and these statuses appear in our behavior and in our brains.  
Recent qualitative research by Osagie Obasogie further supports this 
hypothesis. Obasogie reveals that even the blind make inferences about 
visual physical traits like skin color from non-visual information, up to 
and including odors, in order to carry out racial classification.
136
 When 
asked to describe how they came to structure racial perceptions in visual 
categories (despite not having any visual data to work with), blind study 
participants explained that others communicated status information to 
them as children and, with it, the attachment of those status arrangements 
to visual information.
137
 Moreover, these visually-arranged status 
hierarchies lead to concrete bias even in the blind—Obasogie strikingly 
recounts how one blind person refused to be rescued from a pond by 
someone whom she perceived as black.
138
 That even the blind encode 
racial hierarchy visually, when they cannot possibly have observed visual 
data directly, suggests that racial hierarchy is a product of cultural training. 
Accordingly, Obasogie summarizes his findings as follows:  
Not only do blind people have the same visual understanding of 
race as their sighted peers, but this visual understanding of race also 
shapes their daily interactions as it does for sighted individuals. 
Visual understandings of race do not stem from their obviousness as 
 
 
 135. Note that our racial hierarchy appears to be embedded in, or at least symbolized by, our 
linguistic conventions as well. See SpearIt, Enslaved by Words: Legalities & Limitations of “Post-
Racial” Language, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 705, 732–35 (describing linguistic association of 
whiteness qua color with purity and blackness qua color with contamination and the way this 
association tracks our social practices with respect to racial categories). 
 136. OBASOGIE, supra note 120, at 66–67. 
 137. Id. at 82–93.  
 138. Id. at 86. See also id. at 87 (recounting story of blind white person who learned that a 
romantic partner was black and ended the relationship). 
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much as they do from the social practices that shape the way we 
think about race.
139
  
This supposition is also supported by our history of legal racial 
classifications. When racial identity was litigated in the American courts, 
high-status “white behavior” was used not just as the social expectation of 
whiteness, but also as direct evidence of whiteness.
140
 That evidentiary 
assumption is exactly the social notion that manifests cognitively in the 
research described in Part II: if high-status, then white; if low status, then 
nonwhite. 
The remainder of this Part will further describe how our culture has 
assigned these statuses.
141
 
B. The Historical Construction of Racial Categories 
There is substantial historical evidence that at the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, the socioeconomic elite in colonial Virginia created the 
category “white” in order to split a nascent political alliance between poor 
and bonded laborers of European descent and poor and bonded laborers of 
African descent. They did so by dividing the laborers into a hierarchically 
ordered pair of races. The goal was to “enlist [poor whites] actively, or at 
least passively, in keeping down the Negro bond-laborer with whom they 
had made common cause.”142  
In the seventeenth century, European and African-descended bonded 
laborers in the Virginia colony were often allied—fleeing their masters 
together, marrying against their masters’ wishes, and even rebelling 
together.
143
 During that period, the social status of free colonists of African 
descent was substantially greater than that of later years: they owned land, 
litigated against free colonists of European descent as equals, and even 
 
 
 139. Id. at 127. 
 140. See Jessica A. Clarke, Adverse Possession of Identity: Radical Theory, Conventional 
Practice, 84 OR. L. REV. 563, 641–43 (2005) (recounting behavioral race cases). 
 141.  Lawrence worries that the turn in contemporary race scholarship from cultural and structural 
explanations of racial inequality to explanations rooted in individual cognitive bias may undermine the 
project of remedying societal inequality. Charles Lawrence III, Unconscious Racism Revisited: 
Reflections on the Impact and Origins of ‘The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection’, 40 CONN. L. REV. 
931, 956–66 (2008). This subpart has suggested that Lawrence’s worries can be relieved, for the 
cognitive cannot be healed without healing the culture. 
 142. THEODORE W. ALLEN, THE INVENTION OF THE WHITE RACE, VOLUME II: THE ORIGIN OF 
RACIAL OPPRESSION IN ANGLO-AMERICA 249 (2d ed. 2012). 
 143. Id. at 153–61 (flight and marriage), 213–5 (rebellion). See also EDMUND S. MORGAN, 
AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM 308, 327 (2d ed. 2005) (further explaining relationship 
between inception of racialized slavery and inhibition of nascent cross-”racial” lower-class collective 
action). 
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owned bonded laborers, including bonded laborers of European descent.
144
 
The very term “white” does not appear in the first sixty years of Virginia 
colonial records.
145
 
After Bacon’s Rebellion at the end of the seventeenth century, planter 
elites feared continued unrest from the alliance of European and African 
bonded laborers.
146
 Accordingly, in the early eighteenth century, they 
worked to build an alliance with poorer colonists of European descent by 
creating a social hierarchy according to which the privileges of citizenship 
were granted to all “whites” and denied to all “negroes.”147 In pursuit of 
this strategy, the Virginia Assembly disenfranchised all “free negro, 
mulatto, or Indian” members of the community, and Governor William 
Gooch openly admitted that the purpose of this enactment was to lower the 
social status of members of these racial groups.
148
 During the same period, 
numerous other laws were enacted to carve out an inferior social status for 
blacks.
149
 Particularly, anti-miscegenation laws appeared first in Virginia 
in 1691, and then spread across the colonies.
150
 
At the same time, the planter elite enacted measures to increase the 
status of European-descended laborers. In particular, they wrote economic 
subsidies into law for the newly created category of “whites,” including 
laws mandating that white laborers be employed in a specified proportion 
to the number of enslaved blacks on any given plantation.
151
 The strategy 
worked: European servant rebellions stopped, and the elites no longer felt 
the need to fear lower-class, cross-”racial” alliance.152 
 
 
 144. ALLEN, supra note 142, at 180–87. See also Paul Finkelman, The Origins of Colorism in 
Early American Law, in COLOR MATTERS, supra note 7, at 29–33 (describing introduction of racial 
categories into Virginia law). Finkelman also explains why this focus on Virginia’s racial history is 
significant for America as a whole: “most of the southern colonies adopted the rules and laws coming 
out of Virginia in this period.” Id. at 29. For more references, see STEVE MARTINOT, THE RULE OF 
RACIALIZATION: CLASS, IDENTITY, GOVERNANCE 36–72 (2003). See also id. at 75–81 (another 
interpretation in terms of class conflict). 
 145. ALLEN, supra note 142, at x (introduction of Jeffery B. Perry). 
 146. Id. at 218–19. 
 147. Id. at 240. 
 148. Id. at 241–42. 
 149. Id. at 251–52. 
 150. MORGAN, supra note 143, at 334–35; ARIELA J. GROSS, WHAT BLOOD WON’T TELL: A 
HISTORY OF RACE ON TRIAL IN AMERICA 18 (2008). See also Finkleman, supra note 144, at 32–33 
(explaining background of anti-miscegenation laws in laws prohibiting concerted action between 
blacks and whites and “discourage[ing] interracial challenges to the planter class”). 
 151. ALLEN, supra note 142, at 252–53. See also MORGAN, supra note 143, at 331–37, 344–45 
(special legal privileges and economic subsidies for “Christian white servants”). 
 152. ALLEN, supra note 142, at 251–52. 
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Thus, from the very beginning, race in the U.S. was created by the state 
for the purpose of imposing hierarchical subordination on nonwhites.
153
 
And this quickly became entrenched into our culture to the point that we 
became unable to remember a time when it had been otherwise. In 1806, 
Judge Tucker of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia could declare, 
in Hudgins v. Wrights, that “[f]rom the first settlement of the colony of 
Virginia to the year 1778, (Oct. Sess.) all negroes, Moors, and mulattoes, 
except Turks and Moors in amity with Great Britain, brought into this 
country by sea, or by land, were slaves,”154 and, by contrast, that “[a]ll 
white persons are and ever have been free in this country.”155 Barely a 
century after the crude legislative divide-and-conquer strategy of the elite 
brought it into being, the black-white racial and status distinction had 
become an eternal fact.  
Should the reader doubt the continuing relevance of our historical 
construction of race categories for current practices, current research in 
political science should help. According to recent work by Avidit 
Acharya, Matthew Blackwell, and Maya Sen, the geographical 
concentration of slavery exerts a continuing effect on racial attitudes even 
today: the concentration of slave ownership in 1860 predicts party 
identification, opposition to affirmative action, and resentment of blacks in 
a survey of white respondents in the South.
156
 After excluding a number of 
potential mechanisms, the authors suggest, that this can be explained by 
the influence of parents on their children’s racial attitudes 157 To the extent 
 
 
 153. See Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Rethinking Racism: Toward a Structural Interpretation 62 AM. 
SOC. REV. 465, 471–72 (1996) (giving references for the “invention” of racial categories “to justify the 
conquest and exploitation of various peoples”). See also Michele Goodwin, Nigger and the 
Construction of Citizenship, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 129, 143–86 (2003) (providing broad and deep history 
of interrelated public and private construction of stigmatized black identity in the form of the n-word). 
 154. 11 Va. 134, 137 (1806). I thank Herb Hovenkamp for suggesting I discuss this case. 
 155. Id. at 139. 
 156. Avidit Acharya et al., The Political Legacy of American Slavery 7–13 (Nov. 21, 2014) 
(unpublished) (available at http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/msen/files/slavery.pdf). There is also 
evidence that the construction of racial hierarchy in the nineteenth century contributes directly to 
contemporary disadvantage. See Heather A. O’Connell, The Impact of Slavery on Racial Inequality in 
Poverty in the Contemporary U.S. South, 90 SOC. FORCES 713, 727 (2012) (finding that counties in 
which there were more slaves in 1860 show higher black poverty rates today); Graziella Bertocchi & 
Arcangelo Dimico, Slavery, Education and Inequality, 70 EUR. ECON. REV. 197 (2014) (showing that 
counties with higher proportion of slaves in 1860 suffer from greater contemporary racial income 
inequality as well as greater contemporary racial educational attainment inequality and lower per 
capita spending on education). 
 157. Acharya et al., supra 156, at 32; Avidit Acharya et al., Attitudes Shaped by Violence 2–4 
(Nov. 5, 2013) (unpublished) (available at http://www.mattblackwell.org/files/papers/slaverytheory. 
pdf) (giving theory of southern racism according to which racism was initially motivated by economic 
incentives to secure continuing black labor after emancipation and later persisted through “inter-
generational socialization”).  
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this is correct, there is compelling evidence for the notion that the political 
effect of racial politics, and the state action that drove it, can linger for 
hundreds of years and affect contemporary individual behavior. 
Accordingly, because it created these conditions in the first place, the state 
must bear some of the blame for the persistence of the psychological facts 
described in Part II.  
C. Segregation and Racialized Spaces 
This subpart describes the origin and persistence of residential 
segregation and the consequent creation of racialized spaces—spaces that 
are associated with racial groups (e.g., the black neighborhood or the white 
school). It also describes the consequences of the racialization of space. 
This includes both perceptual isolation that supports the stereotype 
formation described in the previous Part
158
 and physical/social isolation 
that permits numerous types of concrete racial disadvantage.
159
  
At the start of the twentieth century, there was surprisingly little 
residential racial segregation.
160
 However, in the early part of the century, 
segregated neighborhoods were created in the north as a response to 
industrialization and black migration to the northern cities.
161
 Strategies 
used to create residential segregation included racially motivated violence 
by whites, coordinated economic action by whites to keep blacks out of 
their neighborhoods, zoning restrictions and other local government 
actions taken against black residents, racially restrictive covenants, 
“blockbusting”—real estate agents consciously taking advantage of white 
fear of black neighbors to concentrate blacks in ghettos—and, in the 
South, enforcement of de jure segregation laws.
162
 After the World Wars, 
government investments in suburban transportation and homeownership 
programs for veterans facilitated white flight.
163
 There was also copious 
 
 
 158. This is the case particularly with reference to the phenomenon of illusory correlation, which 
is facilitated by limited cross-racial exposure. 
 159. Early life residential segregation predicts a preference for segregated neighborhoods as well 
as observed workplace segregation. Brondolo et al., supra note 75, at 364 (discussing studies).  
 160. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND 
THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 20 (1993). 
 161. Id. at 26–30. 
 162. Id. at 26–41. 
 163. Id. at 44. These programs were conceived of and administered in a discriminatory fashion. 
See Juan F. Perea, Doctrines of Delusion: Bakke, Fisher and the Case for a New Affirmative Action, 
INST. FOR HIGHER EDUC. LAW & GOVERNANCE 1, 4 (2013), http://www.law.uh.edu/ihelg/monograph/ 
13-02.pdf (describing veterans programs). See also Brondolo et al., supra note 75, at 364 (further 
references on racially motivated postwar housing programs). 
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private discrimination in the real estate industry in that period.
164
 
Government complicity in the discrimination included “redlining”—or 
endorsing lending discrimination—a practice that sometimes excluded 
entire cities from federal loan benefits.
165
 It also included “slum 
redevelopment” that further displaced blacks and concentrated blacks in 
public housing projects.
166
  
After the civil rights legislation of the 1960s, existing patterns of racial 
segregation were maintained by private discrimination. Such 
discrimination included continuing systematic real estate industry 
discrimination, such as “steering” customers to racialized neighborhoods 
or failing to advertise mixed-race neighborhoods,
167
 as well as the 
unwillingness of individual whites to move to mixed-race 
neighborhoods.
168
 Lenders also discriminated against mixed-race 
neighborhoods.
169
 “White flight” further contributes to continuing 
segregation: simply put, whites tend to leave neighborhoods with a 
substantial number of black people.
170
 Moreover, the state remains 
complicit today in racial residential segregation by directing disparate 
police attention and intimidation against blacks and other people of color 
when they leave minority neighborhoods.
171
  
While residential segregation has declined over the last few decades, it 
remains significant.
172
 Importantly, even though we intuitively would 
expect economic segregation, driven by factors like housing prices in the 
most desirable areas, to be more important than racial segregation, the 
most recent analyses show this to not be true: blacks and Latinos are both 
more segregated from whites than are the poor from the wealthy.
173
 This 
residential racial segregation has had dramatic effects on black 
disadvantage. Massey and Denton have shown that racial segregation 
 
 
 164. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 160, at 50–51. 
 165. Id. at 51–55. 
 166. Id. at 55–56. 
 167. Id. at 98–105. 
 168. Id. at 92–96. 
 169. Id. at 106–07. 
 170. See Lincoln Quillian, Why Is Black–White Residential Segregation So Persistent?: Evidence 
on Three Theories from Migration Data, 31 SOC. SCI. RES. 197, 198–200 (2002) (discussing empirical 
evidence for white flight). 
 171. DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK 102–04 
(2002) (recounting stories of police suspicion and harassment of minorities living in white 
neighborhoods). 
 172. While there is some evidence that residential segregation has been on the decline since 
Massey and Denton wrote, blacks are still highly segregated. Bonilla-Silva, supra note 153, at 32.  
 173. Leah Platt Boustan, Racial Residential Segregation in American Cities 3 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19045, 2013), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w19045. 
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leads to concentrated poverty, which in turn worsens the condition even of 
non-poor blacks—because they are subjected to the social consequences of 
poverty despite their relative wealth—and improves the condition of 
whites.
174
 The concentration of poverty leads to a tipping-point 
phenomenon whereby property owners have a reduced incentive to invest 
in their land, driving property values into a death spiral, leading to 
commercial flight, worsening crime, higher rates of reliance on public 
benefits, inferior schools, and all the familiar misfortunes of the black 
inner city.
175
 This effect, we can conclude, is likely to be recursive: since 
concentrated poverty in black neighborhoods drives the economic 
condition of all people in the neighborhood down, this will lead to still 
more poverty in those neighborhoods and will cause whites to avoid them 
all the more assiduously.
176
  
The housing market continues to be racialized today. In recent years, 
two groups of researchers studied landlord responses to Internet housing 
inquiries. Both studies varied their e-mails only by signing some of them 
with stereotypically black names (“Tyrell Jackson,” “Tyrone Johnson”). In 
both experiments, the e-mails with black names received significantly 
fewer responses than the e-mails with white names.
177
  
 
 
 174. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 160, at 118–28.  
 175. Id. at 130–42. 
 176. See Lincoln Quillian, Segregation and Poverty Concentration: The Role of Three 
Segregations, 77 AM. SOC. REV. 354, 354–57 (2012) (finding empirical support for Massey and 
Denton’s theory of the economic consequences of segregation, adding insight into role of proximity 
only to lower-income members of other races). On the self-reinforcing nature of segregation and other 
kinds of opportunity hoarding/racial cartel behavior, see generally Daria Roithmayr, Them That Has, 
Gets, 27 MISS. C. L. REV. 373 (2008) (giving general theory of “feedback loops” in perpetuation of 
racial inequality). 
 177. Michelle E. Feldman & Allyson J. Weseley, Which Name Unlocks the Door?: The Effect of 
Tenant Race/Ethnicity on Landlord Response, 43 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. E416 (2013); Adrian G. 
Carpusor & William E. Loges, Rental Discrimination and Ethnicity in Names, 36 J. APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 934 (2006). In another version of that experiment, landlords discriminated against blacks, 
but when e-mails were accompanied with social status information favorable to a black sender, the 
discrimination disappeared. Andrew Hanson & Zackary Hawley. Do Landlords Discriminate in the 
Rental Housing Market?: Evidence from an Internet Field Experiment in US Cities, 70 J. URB. ECON. 
99, 113–14 (2011). This is consistent with the supposition of the cognitive hierarchical model that 
racial attributions are inextricably linked to status. However, it is unclear from this study whether those 
subjects who received high-status information attached to black names failed to attribute blackness to 
the senders for that very reason or the subjects simply applied specific counter-stereotypic information 
to falsify their previous assumption that black applicants would be less desirable. 
 This phenomenon also exists in the purchase market. See Bo Zhao et al., Why do Real Estate 
Brokers Continue To Discriminate?: Evidence from the 2000 Housing Discrimination Study, 59 J. 
URB. ECON. 394, 395 (2006) (documenting discrimination in housing sales); Stephen L. Ross & 
Margery Austin Turner, Housing Discrimination in Metropolitan America: Explaining Changes 
between 1989 and 2000, 52 SOC. PROBS. 152, 165–74 (2005) (finding persistent discrimination in the 
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Racialized spaces, of course, directly reinforce hierarchical statuses. 
The impact of racial segregation on the phenomenon of illusory correlation 
is perhaps most obvious: to the extent whites are not exposed to blacks in 
their daily lives, such that many whites are only exposed to blacks in the 
form of crime-ridden TV news reports, they are likely to generate the 
stereotype that blacks are criminals.
178
 And segregation, by subjecting 
blacks to more and concentrated disadvantage, reinforces the stereotype 
that blacks are associated with the social consequences of that 
disadvantage, such as welfare receipt and, again, crime. Perhaps most 
strikingly, spatial separation can serve as a proxy for visual data. Obasogie 
has found that parents of the blind used segregated spaces as a way of 
constructing racial identity for their children, reinforcing the message that 
white spaces were preferable in the absence of a visual reference for 
race.
179
 
Empirical data have supported the segregation/poverty death spiral 
postulated by Massey and Denton, indicating that segregation impairs long 
term movement toward equality by depressing home appreciation, and 
thus wealth accumulation, by black families.
180
 Actually, the median black 
homeowner (unlike both whites and Latinos) turns out to be, on the whole, 
subject to depreciation rather than appreciation.
181
 And, consistent with 
Massey and Denton’s theory, this appreciation disparity is exacerbated by 
concentrated poverty.
182
 This relationship has earned a name: “the 
segregation tax.”183 
Moreover, residential racial segregation has pernicious political effects. 
Because only blacks benefit from public goods created in black 
 
 
purchase market, although overall decline over 11 years, and noting a sustained level of steering 
discrimination against blacks as well).  
 178. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 179. OBASOGIE, supra note 120, at 90–92. 
 180. Chenoa Flippen, Unequal Returns to Housing Investments?: A Study of Real Housing 
Appreciation Among Black, White, and Hispanic Households, 82 SOC. FORCES 1523, 1523–25 (2004). 
 181. Id. at 1535. 
 182. Id. at 1541. 
 183. DAVID RUSK, BROOKINGS INST. CTR. ON URBAN & METRO. POL., THE “SEGREGATION TAX”: 
THE COST OF RACIAL SEGREGATION TO BLACK HOMEOWNERS (2001), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2001/10/metropolitanpolicy%20rusk/rusk.pdf 
(finding that 18% lower values for black than white homes, controlling for income, is attributable to 
segregation). See generally Thomas M. Shapiro, Race, Homeownership and Wealth, 20 WASH. U. J.L. 
& POL’Y 53 (2006) (explaining the importance of homes, and the role of segregation, in racial wealth 
disparities); THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING AFRICAN AMERICAN: HOW WEALTH 
PERPETUATES INEQUALITY (2004) (book-length treatment of racial wealth disparity as factor in 
persistence of racial inequality). 
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neighborhoods, blacks, unlike other groups, are unable to form cross-
group political alliances to get those public goods created.
184
  
Unsurprisingly, growing up in a poor black neighborhood suppresses a 
citizen’s expected earnings by 18–27%.185 In general, residential racial 
segregation has profound effects on practically every aspect of black 
life.
186
 Blacks have substantially less income and wealth, a substantially 
higher unemployment rate, substantially lower educational attainment, and 
substantially higher crime victimization rates than do whites.
187
 This is not 
a coincidence: the consequences of “past” residential segregation persist 
from generation to generation.
188
 Black children who grow up in poor 
neighborhoods remain in poor neighborhoods.
189
 Moreover, even increases 
in parental income lead to higher income for children less often for blacks 
than for whites; that is, parental upward mobility is not passed on to black 
children, at least in part because income increases in black families are 
often not sufficient to allow them to escape their poor and segregated 
neighborhoods.
190
 Seventy percent of black families start out in 
neighborhoods in the bottom quartile of the income distribution in the first 
generation; 65% end up there in the next generation.
191
 Part of this is due 
to geographic isolation from available jobs: lower-wage blacks are 
concentrated in central cities, while many of the jobs they might seek are 
spread out in the suburbs.
192
 In the home lending market, racial minorities, 
 
 
 184. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 160, at 155. 
 185. Id. at 178. 
 186. This Part is greatly indebted to the analysis of the relationship between segregation and 
disadvantage in ANDERSON, supra note 115.  
 187. See sources cited id. at 23–25.  
 188. See generally Patrick Sharkey, The Intergenerational Transmission of Context, 113 AM. J. 
SOC. 931 (2008) (describing persistence of effects of residential segregation over generations). 
 189. Id. at 933 (“[M]ore than 70% of black children who are raised in the poorest quarter of 
American neighborhoods will continue to live in the poorest quarter of neighborhoods as adults. Since 
the 1970s, more than half of black families have lived in the poorest quarter of neighborhoods in 
consecutive generations, compared to just 7% of white families.”). 
 190. Id. at 951–53. Moreover, only 35% of blacks whose parents were in the top quartile of the 
income distribution remain there themselves, compared to 63% of whites. Id. at 953. 
 191. Id. at 953 tbl.3, 954 tbl.4. 
 192. Margery Austin Turner, Residential Segregation and Employment Inequality, in 
SEGREGATION: THE RISING COSTS FOR AMERICA 151, 164 (James H. Carr & Nandinee K. Kutty eds., 
2008). This distance raises not just transportation problems but also information ones: blacks have a 
harder time learning about jobs that are advertised in distant suburbs or jobs advertised by referrals in 
the social networks of the current (white) workers. Id. at 170–71. See also Rachel Garshick Kleit, 
Neighborhood Segregation, Personal Networks, and Access to Social Resources, in SEGREGATION: 
THE RISING COSTS FOR AMERICA, supra note 192, at 237, 237–60 (providing more detail about effects 
of segregation in impoverishing black social networks and reducing their economic opportunities). As 
of this writing, a recent poll has confirmed the continuing segregation of the social world. White-
identified respondents reported that 91% of the top seven people with whom they identified as having 
important conversations were white, and only 1% black. Black-identified respondents reported that 
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holding their creditworthiness constant, pay more for credit because their 
segregated neighborhoods are particularly attractive to subprime predatory 
lenders and particularly unattractive to traditional lenders.
193
 Accordingly, 
in 2008 the black unemployment and poverty rates were more than double 
those of whites, and an average black family had a tenth the net worth of a 
white family.
194
 
Schools, too, are subject to substantial de facto segregation thanks to 
residential segregation. Even in districts that are declared “unitary,” school 
segregation increases after their desegregation orders are lifted.
195
 
Moreover, the schools in racially segregated neighborhoods provide a 
worse education due to the effect of concentrated poverty on their tax 
bases, on the desirability of the locations for high-quality teachers, and on 
the social problems associated with poverty (e.g., illness, malnutrition), 
which interfere with education.
196
  
A single example will highlight the continuing problem of residential 
and school segregation. As of this writing, the City of Huntsville, Alabama 
is still under a desegregation order in a lawsuit that was first filed in 1963. 
On June 30, 2014, the U.S. District Court found that “although black 
students make up 41% of the district’s total enrollment, almost all of the 
40 public schools in the Huntsville City School district are racially 
identifiable.”197 The Court further noted that there is a “strong correlation 
between race and the relative strength of educational programs throughout 
the district.”198 Consistent with the noted pattern, the school district 
 
 
83% of their conversation partners were black and 8% were white. PUB. RELIGION RESEARCH INST., 
ANALYSIS: RACE AND AMERICANS’ SOCIAL NETWORKS (Aug. 28, 2014), http://publicreligion.org/ 
research/2014/08/analysis-social-network/. 
 193. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, From Credit Denial to Predatory Lending: The 
Challenge of Sustaining Minority Homeownership, in SEGREGATION: THE RISING COSTS FOR 
AMERICA, supra note 192, at 81, 89–96. 
 194. BONILLA-SILVA, supra note 55, at 257. 
 195. Sean F. Reardon et al., Brown Fades: The End of Court-Ordered School Desegregation and 
the Resegregation of American Public Schools, 31 J. POL. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 876, 899–900 (2012). 
See also Erica Frankenberg, The Role of Residential Segregation in Contemporary School 
Segregation, 45 EDUC. & URB. SOC’Y 548, 548 (2013) (finding strong empirical relationship between 
residential and school segregation); Gary Orfield et al., Deepening Segregation in American Public 
Schools: A Special Report from the Harvard Project on School Desegregation, EQUITY & 
EXCELLENCE EDUC., Sept. 1997, at 5, 5 (similar). For a number of case studies, see GARY ORFIELD ET 
AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
(1996).  
 196. See generally Deborah L. McKoy & Jeffrey M. Vincent, Housing and Education: The 
Inextricable Link, in SEGREGATION: THE RISING COSTS FOR AMERICA, supra note 192, at 125, 125–50. 
 197. Wellington v. Huntsville Bd. of Educ., No. 5:63-cv-00109-MHH, slip op. at 66 (N.D. Ala. 
June 30, 2014), available at http://media.al.com/news_impact/other/ruling.pdf. 
 198. Id. at 78. 
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blames this school segregation on residential segregation, which it 
attributes to “private choice.”199 The black students in Huntsville are 
relatively lucky: because their school district has been under a segregation 
order for five decades, they have the advantage of a legal status quo 
designed to protect their interests. Black students in schools that have 
never been under segregation orders, or that have been declared unitary in 
the last fifty years, are not so fortunate. In those schools, the “private 
choice” argument works to bar any judicial remedy, as it did in Milliken v. 
Bradley.
200
 
Statistically, being black is correlated with numerous other kinds of 
disadvantage. At the most basic level, blackness kills: being black is 
associated with a shorter life expectancy than being white.
201
 The health 
disparity between blacks and whites has increased over time.
202
 Racial 
segregation is instrumental in this disadvantage, thanks to the 
concentration of health risks in minority neighborhoods as well as the 
absence of health-facilitating services such as grocery stories selling 
healthy food.
203
 
In addition, blacks are subject to disproportionately harsh treatment at 
every stage of the criminal process, from investigation through 
sentencing.
204
 In 1995, a third of black men between ages 20–29 were 
locked up or under probation or parole supervision.
205
 Of course, the 
 
 
 199. Id. at 67. 
 200. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). There, Justice Stewart declared, in concurrence, that residential 
segregation arose from “unknown and perhaps unknowable factors such as in-migration, birth rates, 
economic changes, or cumulative acts of private racial fears,” thus relieving the state of all 
responsibility for the situation in which black students found themselves. Id. at 756 n.2 (Stewart, J., 
concurring). 
 201. ELIZABETH ARIAS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., UNITED STATES LIFE TABLES, 
2008, 3 (2012), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_03.pdf. 
 202. Robert S. Levine et al., Black-White Inequalities in Mortality and Life Expectancy, 1933–
1999: Implications for Healthy People 2010, 116 PUB. HEALTH REP. 474, 479–80 (2001) (showing 
increase in health inequality from 1979 to 1998). See also PERRY, supra note 48, at 42 (discussing 
literature on health discrimination against blacks). There is some evidence for a direct (i.e. unmediated 
by social circumstances) effect of racial bias on the health of blacks. Researchers found that blacks 
who had stronger internalized anti-black racial bias (as measured by the IAT) and also reported 
experiencing more racism had more genetic markers of aging, even after controlling for things like 
poverty. David H. Chae et al., Discrimination, Racial Bias, and Telomere Length in African-American 
Men, 46 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 103, 106–08 (2014). 
 203. See generally Renee E. Walker et al., Disparities and Access to Healthy Food in the United 
States: A Review of Food Deserts Literature, 16 HEALTH & PLACE 876, 876–77 (2010) (reviewing 
literature). 
 204. The most complete discussion of the racial disparities in the criminal process is MICHELLE 
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN AN AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2d ed. 
2012). See also ANDERSON, supra note 115, at 128–29; DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND 
CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 16–62, 101–57 (1999). 
 205. Harris, supra note 91, at 71. 
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concentration of crime as well as aggressive policing in black 
neighborhoods means that residential segregation is inextricably 
intertwined with the social construction of blacks (and Latinos) as 
criminals—the physical and social environment in segregated 
communities marks residents as criminals even from childhood. For 
example, Victor Rios describes how ongoing criminalization begins in the 
schools of black and Latino neighborhoods in Oakland, where police use 
the criminal justice system as a disciplinary measure; schools themselves 
are often turned into heavily-policed environments and school personnel 
are in cahoots with police on the lookout for opportunities to bring 
students into the system.
206
 In segregated neighborhoods, even the victims 
of crime can themselves be criminalized. Rios describes one youth who, 
after becoming the target of random gang violence, was falsely entered 
into a police database of known gang members on the assumption that he 
must have been a member of a competing gang.
207
 On the streets of 
segregated communities, police sometimes leave the vulnerable to their 
own devices and even encourage them to use self-help violence to defend 
themselves from crimes the police do not bother to try to prevent.
208
 Thus, 
racially disparate law enforcement is enabled by the creation of minority 
spaces and white spaces, in which police behave differently.  
 
 
 206. VICTOR M. RIOS, PUNISHED: POLICING THE LIVES OF BLACK AND LATINO BOYS 28, 57–63, 
79–82 (2011). 
 207. Id. at 28, 76–78. 
 208. Id. at 28, 52–57, 72–73. See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 69–
75 (1997) (arguing that racial disparity in criminal justice includes both underprotection as well as 
overcriminalization of blacks). This neglect has been empirically observed. Stephanie L. Kent & 
David Jacobs, Minority Threat and Police Strength from 1980 to 2000: A Fixed-Effects Analysis of 
Nonlinear and Interactive Effects in Large U.S. Cities, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 731, 752–53 (2005) found 
that cities with large black populations have larger police departments, except where the black 
populations are highly segregated, in which case they have smaller police departments—precisely 
what we would expect to see if politically powerful whites take advantage of the isolation of blacks to 
neglect crime control in black neighborhoods, but attend to crime control when it reaches their own 
neighborhoods. However, this result must be taken with some hesitation: Brian J. Stults & Eric P. 
Baumer, Racial Context and Police Force Size: Evaluating the Empirical Validity of the Minority 
Threat Perspective, 113 AM. J. SOC. 507, 526 (2007) find by contrast that more segregated 
communities have larger police departments. Some additional evidence for the neglect of crime control 
in black communities can be found in Lisa Stolzenberg et al., A Multilevel Test of Racial Threat 
Theory, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 673, 687–90 (2004), which found that in segregated cities reports of crime 
committed by blacks are less likely to result in an arrest than reports of crime committed by whites, but 
that it is the other way around in integrated cities. However, segregated cities are more likely than 
integrated cities to make an arrest when a white victim reports a crime committed by a black 
perpetrator. The implication is that “black-on-black crime” is neglected in segregated cities, but 
“black-on-white-crime” is not: these cities are inadequately motivated or equipped to protect blacks 
from violence. Some of the responsibility for this must be attributed to the municipal boundaries that 
deprive poorer black communities of public goods, including adequate police services, about which 
see infra Part IV.B.  
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The workplace is also a racialized space. Blacks and Latinos are 
subject to persistent discrimination in the employment market. This both 
exacerbates residential segregation by impoverishing workers and 
reducing their mobility, and is exacerbated by it—e.g., by the role of 
segregation in the criminalization of people of color and consequent job 
market disadvantage. One recent study found that otherwise equivalent 
black and Latino job applicants generated less interest from employers 
than whites who had recently been released from prison.
209
 That study 
revealed both blatantly intentional discrimination, such as an employer 
who saw equivalent white, black, and Latino candidates at the same time, 
and, without discussion, sent only the black candidate away;
210
 or the 
employer who told black and Latino candidates that the job was filled and 
invited the white candidate to start on the spot;
211
 as well as slightly more 
subtle channeling of blacks away from customer-facing positions and less 
charitable evaluations of blacks’ work histories.212 Similarly, audit tests 
involving stereotypically white or black names also show a substantial 
amount of racial discrimination: “[w]hite names receive 50 percent more 
callbacks for interviews,” and this “racial gap is uniform across 
occupation, industry, and employer size.”213 This latter study measured the 
qualitative impact of race: “[a] [w]hite name yields as many more 
callbacks as an additional eight years of experience on a resume.”214 
As this Part has shown, the state has been complicit in the creation and 
maintenance of racialized spaces, both with its direct complicity in 
twentieth century segregation, as well as its role in supporting the 
stigmatized racial ascriptions with which we continue to live. Accordingly, 
it is complicit in the continuing cognitions that today drive private racial 
 
 
 209. Devah Pager et al., Discrimination in a Low-Wage Labor Market: A Field Experiment, 74 
AM. SOC. REV. 777, 785–86 (2009). On the whole, blacks generated half as much interest as whites. 
Id. at 784. See also DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS 
INCARCERATION 146–49 (2007) (describing further audit study results and the cumulative economic 
effect of racial employment discrimination and disparate racial exposure to criminal justice system, as 
well as arguing that long-term employment credentials of black workers are impaired by early-on labor 
market discrimination); PERRY, supra note 48, at 235 n.20 (citing further evidence); Donald 
Tomaskovic-Devey et al., Race and the Accumulation of Human Capital Across the Career: A 
Theoretical Model and Fixed-Effects Application, 111 AM. J. SOC. 58, 58 (2005) (providing evidence 
for long-term human capital cost to blacks of racial employment discrimination). 
 210. Pager, supra note 209, at 787. 
 211. Id. at 788. 
 212. Id. at 789–91. 
 213. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than 
Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991, 
991 (2004). 
 214. Id. at 992. 
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bias. The next Part will argue that this complicity requires a constitutional 
remedy. 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF RACIAL HIERARCHY 
This Part argues, based on the legal ideal of the rule of law as 
incorporated into the Equal Protection Clause, that the state must cease 
propping up racial hierarchy. After briefly describing the relationship 
between the rule of law and Equal Protection, it offers two doctrinal 
implications of the cognitive hierarchical model, of many that are possible. 
First, the United States must eliminate the legal structures that support 
racialized spaces by distributing public goods along racial lines, and 
abandon the doctrinal vestiges that forbid it from doing so, including (in 
part) the requirement that state discrimination be intentional to be subject 
to challenge under the Equal Protection Clause. Second, citizens who 
complain of the individual impact of state support of racial hierarchy 
should be granted standing to seek injunctive relief, even in the face of 
supposedly isolated injuries that are not likely to recur.  
A. The Rule of Law Case Against Racial Hierarchy 
In prior work, I showed that the normative principle, which is within 
the ideal of the rule of law, that the law must be general—captured in 
American law in the Equal Protection Clause—forbids the state from 
reinforcing existing unjust social hierarchies with its legal system by 
making those hierarchies the basis of legal rights and responsibilities.
215
 
To recap the analysis: a conjunction of legal and social arrangements 
violates the rule of law if it is inconsistent with public reasons for the legal 
enactments that establish it—that is, if, in the law’s social context, the 
reasons justifying the law cannot be understood consistent with the equal 
standing of all within the community.
216
 And this will happen when the 
law cannot be understood as justifiable by such reasons from each of three 
standpoints: from the first-person standpoint of those who enact the law, 
who are to be seen as enacting the law to promote the general public good; 
from the second-person standpoint of those who are to obey the law, who 
are to be seen as obeying the law because it helps them comply with 
reasons that already apply to them; and from the third-person standpoint of 
the community at large, who are to be seen as having reasons to take the 
 
 
 215. Gowder, Equal Law in an Unequal World, supra note 27. 
 216. Id. at 1033–37, 1045–47. 
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law as expressing their overall goals for the social relationships they have 
with one another.
217
  
This is an expressive inquiry that does not depend on intentions: if the 
state with its legal system expresses, however unintentionally, the notion 
that the objects of social inequalities are not entitled to equal treatment—
are not equal members of the political community—then the laws in 
question cannot be understood to be general.
218
 In turn, the requirement 
that the laws be general is at the very heart of our constitutional order. A 
law that expresses the inferiority or subordination of some member of the 
community directly denies that person the equal protection of the laws. 
This is not an argument cognizable under current Equal Protection 
Clause doctrine. Rather, it is a Dworkinian interpretation of that doctrine, 
in terms of the principles that justify it.
219
 The suspect classes and levels of 
scrutiny in equal protection doctrine are best understood as expressions of 
the public-reason conception of the rule of law principle of generality, 
which commands greater care to avoid legal distinctions that harm those 
subject to a social history of subordination.
220
 But the broader normative 
principle of generality also has implications beyond the system of suspect 
classifications, including those given below.  
B. Municipal Boundaries as Racialized Spaces 
Consider the laws establishing local government boundaries in the 
United States. Many public goods are divided along local government 
lines, including vital public goods like schools and policing. To establish a 
municipal boundary is for that reason to declare, by a law, a division of the 
world into those citizens who have access to the public goods provided by 
that municipality and those who do not.  
Due to residential segregation, many of these municipal boundaries are 
racialized.
221
 Sometimes, this racialization was intentional. Gregory 
Weiher has argued, based on the post-Brown era legal attacks on 
intrajurisdictional discrimination (i.e., desegregation within municipalities), 
 
 
 217. Id. at 1040–45. 
 218. Id. at 1038. 
 219. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 116–17 (1978) (explaining theory of 
interpretation as finding values that “fit” and “justify” existing legal material). 
 220. Gowder, Equal Law in an Unequal World, supra note 27, at 1032, 1049, 1079 (explaining 
how public reason conception of generality helps us understand—that is, fits and justifies—Equal 
Protection doctrine). 
 221. To repeat and clarify: this Article says that a space is “racialized” when either it is identified 
by the community as predominately occupied by the members of a given race or in fact operates to 
isolate members of different races from one another. 
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along with the refusal to entertain challenges to jurisdictional boundaries 
represented by cases like San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez,
222
 that racial discrimination has shifted to the development of 
municipal boundaries, and its intentional face has primarily shifted into 
segregation by socioeconomic class in order to avoid Equal Protection 
challenges.
223
 Supporting this hypothesis empirically, he demonstrated that 
the amount of variance in minority population accounted for by municipal 
boundaries increased in both Cook County and Los Angeles County 
between 1960 and 1980.
224
  
Some of this racialization may not be intentional. Thousands of new 
municipalities and tens of thousands of special districts (water districts, 
school districts, housing authorities, etc.) were created in the 20th 
century.
225
 Sometimes these acts of municipal creation were motivated by 
desires as simple as excluding profitable commercial property from 
taxation by separating it from the local residents in need of tax-supported 
public goods.
226
 Regardless of the motives underlying the acts, however, 
they served to give a legal face to residential segregation. In the words of 
Nancy Burns: 
[Those who formed new local governments] used the form of the 
city to keep themselves from being annexed to older cities that had 
populations with higher service needs, smaller tax bases, and thus 
higher taxes. These citizens and businesses were able to define 
unwanted others out of their politics, creating—in fact—political 
boundaries that signified class and racial divisions.
227
 
Signified is the most important word in that passage: the boundaries 
signify racialized spaces, regardless of intent. Moreover, class segregation 
is also race segregation, in view of the extreme economic disparities 
between black and white families. And, due to continuing housing and 
 
 
 222. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 223. Gregory R. Weiher, Public Policy and Patterns of Residential Segregation, 42 W. POL. Q. 
651, 655–56 (1989).  
 224. Id. at 660–62. See also NANCY BURNS, THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS: PRIVATE VALUES IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS 36–37 (1994) (citing egregious cases of 
intentional discrimination in the creation of municipalities to exclude racial minorities, particularly 
blacks); id. at 83–92 (giving additional empirical support); Jonathan T. Rothwell, Racial Enclaves and 
Density Zoning: The Institutionalized Segregation of Racial Minorities in the United States, 13 AM. L. 
& ECON. REV. 290, 347–48 (2011) (finding that local government low-density zoning rules are 
responsible for a substantial proportion of existing residential segregation). 
 225. See BURNS, supra note 224, at 4–6. 
 226. Id. at 38–39, 80–81. 
 227. Id. at 76.  
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lending discrimination against blacks, a black family is less likely to be 
able to access a wealthy neighborhood than a white family, even if it 
shares the same level of wealth. The black family can expect to have a 
harder time finding a willing seller or landlord and to be forced to pay 
higher interest rates.  
As evidence that these racial and economic boundaries are genuinely 
enforced by law, consider that American parents are routinely arrested for 
lying about their residences to enroll their children in better-resourced 
public school districts in neighborhoods they cannot afford.
228
 A citizen is 
subject to criminal punishment if she makes use of the public goods of a 
wealthier neighbor without having the financial or social (that is, racial) 
resources to move there.
229
  
Moreover, municipalities create not only physical racialized spaces, but 
also bureaucratic and institutional as well as social racialized spaces. The 
public institutions of poorer and darker municipalities are likely to evolve 
in order to adapt to their environment in a different direction than those of 
richer and lighter municipalities. For example, by structuring space such 
that there is a police department for the white community and a different 
police department for the black community, the state makes it possible for 
those departments to evolve different cultures as well as formal policies 
around things like the use of force and consent searches.
230
 
What are the results? Consider a single example. The city of Palo Alto, 
California, one of the hubs of Silicon Valley, is a largely white center of 
incredible wealth and privilege. Right next door, just across the 101 
freeway (a physical boundary that expresses both legal and racial 
boundaries), is East Palo Alto. In 1992, East Palo Alto earned the dubious 
 
 
 228. See, e.g., Where School Boundary-Hopping Can Mean Time in Jail, AL JAZEERA AM. (Jan 
21, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/america-tonight/america-tonight-blog/2014/1/21/ 
where-school-boundaryhoppingcanmeantimeinjail.html (listing cases), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
ZZ2E-Y6JJ. 
 229. On conceiving of racial identities as commercial resources, see Nancy Leong, Racial 
Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151, 2158–61 (2013). 
 230. Recent empirical research is consistent with this supposition. See Brad W. Smith & Malcom 
D. Holmes, Police Use of Excessive Force in Minority Communities: A Test of the Minority Threat, 
Place, and Community Accountability Hypotheses, 61 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 83, 97 (2014) (finding that 
cities with higher proportion of black and Latino residents, as well as more segregated black residents, 
had more founded complaints of excessive police force). See generally Sandra Bass, Policing Space, 
Policing Race: Social Control Imperatives and Police Discretionary Decisions, 28 SOC. JUST. 156, 
163 (2001) (explaining that residential segregation facilitates the delivery of “qualitatively different” 
policing in black and white communities). 
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distinction of “the murder capital of America.”231 The disparity between 
the two is striking: Palo Alto is largely white and has a wealthy tax base; 
East Palo Alto, a mere footstep across the border, is largely Latino and 
black and much poorer. Compare the two cities’ public revenue to their 
reported racial demographics: 
 Per capita revenue White pop. Black/Latino pop. 
Palo Alto
232
 $6,651 60.6% 8.0% 
East Palo 
Alto
233
 
$1,119 6.2% 80.3% 
The disparity in public revenue arises, unsurprisingly, from greatly 
disparate income and wealth in the two communities:  
 Median income Median home value Poverty rate 
Palo Alto $120,670 >1,000,000 5.7% 
East Palo Alto $48,734 $525,000 16.6% 
The mostly minority residents of East Palo Alto, in short, are legally 
excluded from the immensely better funded public services of mostly 
white and wealthy Palo Alto.
234
  
 
 
 231. Jenifer Warren, E. Palo Alto Murder Rate Worst in U.S.; Drug Wars Blamed, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 5, 1993, http://articles.latimes.com/1993-01-05/local/me-833_1_east-palo-alto, archived at 
http://perma.cc/DVA-97QC. 
 232.  Population and wealth figures in this table and the next for Palo Alto are based on the 2010 
Census and American Community Survey. See City of Palo Alto, BAYAREACENSUS.CA.GOV, 
http://www.bayareacensus.ca.gov/cities/PaloAlto.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/EJD3-BNS6. 
According to those data, the city is 60.6% white non-Hispanic, 1.8% black non-Hispanic, 6.2% 
Hispanic, and 27.0% Asian non-Hispanic. We are not told how much above one million dollars the 
average owner-occupied home is worth. Public revenue figures are based on the city’s FY 2014 
published budget, reporting total revenue of $435,971,723 for a population of 65,544. CITY OF PALO 
ALTO, ADOPTED OPERATING BUDGET FISCAL YEAR 2014 4, 19 (2013), available at 
http://www.cityofpaloalto.org/civicax/filebank/documents/35339. 
 233.  Population and wealth figures in this table and the next for East Palo Alto are based on the 
2010 Census and American Community Survey. See City of East Palo Alto, 
BAYAREACENSUS.CA.GOV, http://www.bayareacensus.ca.gov/cities/EastPaloAlto.htm, archived at 
http://perma.cc/NU5S-BU9X?type=source. According to those data, the city is 6.2% white non-
Hispanic, 15.8% black non-Hispanic, 64.5% Hispanic, and 3.6% Asian non-Hispanic. Public revenue 
figures are based on the city’s 2013–14 published budget, reporting total revenue of $32,089,904 
(2012–13) for a population of 28,675 (2013). CITY OF EAST PALO ALTO, FISCAL YEAR 2013– 2014 
ADOPTED OPERATING BUDGET OS-6, FS-2 (2013), available at http://www.ci.east-palo-
alto.ca.us/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/135. 
 234. The attentive reader will notice that this example appears, statistically, to be about 
segregation between whites and Latinos, not whites and blacks. This is not a problem for my 
argument. First, the share of blacks in East Palo Alto is over eight times that in Palo Alto. Second, 
those racial categories are highly malleable, not least because the African diaspora and “blackness” are 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss2/10
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The data will tell us how much better those public services are. The 
East Palo Alto school district “regularly struggles to provide such basics as 
textbooks, classroom supplies, and building maintenance.”235 Half of the 
schools in the district have “the lowest rating” on the California 
Department of Education’s Academic Performance Index (API).236 
Consider the following statistics:  
 
 Mean API Max API Min API 
Palo Alto 942 995 877 
East Palo Alto 710.33 826 590 
 
For context, the statewide mean API in 2012 was 787, with a standard 
deviation of 106. In Palo Alto, all but one school scored over 900, and the 
worst school in Palo Alto scored better than the best school in East Palo 
Alto.
237
  
 
 
part of the mix of the areas and peoples identified as “Latino.” See generally Frank F. Montalvo & G. 
Edward Codina, Skin Color and Latinos in the United States, 1 ETHNICITIES 321, 323 (2001) 
(describing history of African slavery and subsequent attempts at racial assimilation in Latin America); 
id. at 333–35 (describing ambiguous position of Puerto Ricans in American racial category system); 
Lourdes Martinez-Echazabal, Mestizaje and the Discourse of National/Cultural Identity in Latin 
America, 1845–1959, LATIN AM. PERSP., May 1998, at 21, 21 (describing development of racial 
hybridization as a component of Latino identity), Imani Perry, Of Desi, J. Lo, and Color Matters: Law, 
Critical Race Theory the Architecture of Race, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 139, 146–48 (2005) (highlighting 
discrimination directed at black Latinos and failure to acknowledge black Latinos in contemporary 
American discourse). Third, Latinos doubtless also occupy a subordinate position in America’s racial 
hierarchy relative to whites, and there is no obvious reason to think that the cognitive hierarchical 
model would not apply on similar terms. This Article focuses on the black/white cleavage because of 
the important history and salience of that cleavage to American society, because of the ready 
availability of social scientific evidence, and because my own racial background means I know more 
about and have a personal investment in that cleavage—not in order to suggest that the fundamental 
mechanism of racial hierarchy is any different with respect to other subordinate categories.  
 The situation of Asian-Americans, the fourth racial group represented in these statistics, is of 
course more complicated because of the “model minority” stereotype imposed on them. But while that 
discussion is beyond the scope of this Article, it seems clear that Asian-Americans also suffer 
ascriptive injury. See generally Monica H. Lin et al., Stereotype Content Model Explains Prejudice for 
an Envied Outgroup: Scale of Anti-Asian American Stereotypes, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 34 (2005) (describing Asian-American stereotypes and their harmful effects). The analytic 
difficulties of extending the model to racially liminal categories, like multiracial Americans and 
contemporary African immigrants, will have to await future work. 
 235. Rob Reich, A Failure of Philanthropy: American Charity Shortchanges the Poor, and Public 
Policy Is Partly to Blame, VOICES URB. EDUC., Winter 2012, at 42, 43, available at http://vue. 
annenberginstitute.org/sites/default/files/issuePDF/VUE32.pdf. 
 236. Id.  
 237. Palo Alto data from CALIF. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2012–13 ACCOUNTABILITY PROGRESS 
REPORTING (APR): PALO ALTO UNIFIED (2013), available at http://api.cde.ca.gov/Acnt2013/2012 
Base_Dst.aspx?cYear=&allcds=4369641&cChoice=2012BDst. East Palo Alto data from CALIF. DEP’T 
OF EDUC., 2012–13 ACCOUNTABILITY PROGRESS REPORTING (APR): RAVENSWOOD CITY 
ELEMENTARY (2013), available at http://api.cde.ca.gov/Acnt2013/2012Base_Dst.aspx?cYear=&allcds 
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Nor are the schools the only public service that suffers in East Palo 
Alto. According to a 2010 report by the Berkeley Center for Criminal 
Justice, East Palo Alto “ranks in the top ten among California cities in 
. . . aggravated assault, homicide, and rape,” yet its police department is 
“significantly lower in officers per capita compared to other cities in 
California with similar violent crime rates and other similarly sized cities 
in California.”238 By contrast, Palo Alto suffered exactly one homicide 
from 2009–2013.239 The city of Palo Alto provides a chart comparing the 
total number of FBI Uniform Crime Report Part I crimes with its 
neighboring communities. Based on those figures plus population data 
noted above, I calculate that the 2013 per capita crime rate in East Palo 
Alto was almost double that of Palo Alto.
240
 
When the people of East Palo Alto look across the freeway at the 
public goods from which the law excludes them, we must ask what sort of 
public reasons might justify such laws. Within a political community, such 
as the State of California, which has duties toward all of its citizens, the 
most obvious justification for such internal fragmentation will be that 
California apportions responsibilities for providing public goods to 
subgovernmental units in order to provide them with local control and the 
benefits of local knowledge.
241
 However, this public reason is sensitive to 
social circumstances.
242
 If some municipalities are deprived of the 
 
 
=4168999&cChoice=2012BDst (Ravenswood is the name for the East Palo Alto school district; there 
does not appear to be a high school under the Ravenswood district’s control). Citywide means are my 
calculation based on those data; statewide mean and standard deviation are my calculation based on 
data made available at http://www.cde.ca.gov/ta/ac/ap/apidatafiles.asp. Only one of the Ravenswood 
schools was above the statewide mean, and four out of nine were more than one standard deviation 
below it; all of Palo Alto’s were above the mean, and sixteen out of seventeen were more than one 
standard deviation above. 
 238.  SARAH LAWRENCE & GREGORY SHAPIRO, BERKELEY CTR. FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CRIME 
TRENDS IN THE CITY OF EAST PALO ALTO 3–4 (2010), available at https://www.law.berkeley.edu/ 
files/EPA_Main_Report_Final.pdf. According to Lawrence & Shapiro, these figures actually represent 
a dramatic improvement from previous decades. 
 239.  Crime Statistics, CITY OF PALO ALTO, http://www.cityofpaloalto.org/gov/depts/pol/info/ 
stats.asp (visited Sept. 23, 2014).  
 240.  Palo Alto: 1554 crimes; one per 42.2 residents; East Palo Alto: 1175 crimes; one per 24.4 
residents. A 10 Year Comparison of Part 1 Crime by City, CITY OF PALO ALTO, http://www.cityof 
paloalto.org/civicax/filebank/documents/8350 (visited Sept. 23, 2014).  
 241. See generally Robert E. Goodin, What is so Special About our Fellow Countrymen?, 98 
ETHICS 663 (1988) (explaining assigned responsibility theory of governmental divisions for the case of 
international borders); EVAN FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE: THE STATE AS FIDUCIARY 
(2011) (giving account of the state as a fiduciary of its people). Read together, these make a plausible 
case for local governments as instrumentalities for the effective fulfillment of the state’s fiduciary 
obligations. 
 242. Cf. Goodin, supra note 241, at 685 (arguing that if a state has insufficient resources for 
fulfilling its duties to its people, either the borders or the resource allocations must change). 
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resources necessary to provide public goods for their citizens, then those 
citizens have neither the benefit of local autonomy nor of local knowledge 
in determining how their nonexistent public goods are allocated.  
Another possible justification for municipal boundaries adds to these 
“liberal” reasons broader “communitarian” ones: “freedom from 
domination under, and inefficiencies resulting from, indifferent, ill-
informed, or corrupted distant authorities; but also recognition of the 
social conditions necessary for the meaningful exercise of such 
freedom.”243 This latter idea is meant to suggest “associative richness,” 
that is, the protection of the communities in which our close ties and “our 
broader conceptions of justice and the good life are formulated and 
affirmed.”244 However, while such public reasons may be sufficient to 
justify giving dignity and respect to existing local boundaries and some 
control over local decisions (particularly, for example, with respect to 
culturally significant lawmaking), it hardly works as a justification for 
legally excluding the residents of some localities from the resources— 
such as decent schools—necessary to achieve public goods needed for all 
“conceptions of justice and the good life.” 
These most obvious public reasons not being available, we should turn 
our attention to the expressive content of such municipal boundaries, in 
light of the ideas about the hierarchical nature of race developed in this 
Article.
245
 As the boundaries track a hierarchical category, creating 
racialized spaces—spaces identified with unjust social hierarchy—and 
then allocating greatly unequal public burdens and benefits along those 
lines, the only possible ostensible justifications for these boundaries are 
manifestly nonpublic reasons that incorporate the existing racial hierarchy. 
That is, such spaces suggest that racial minorities who have been pushed 
into these burdened communities are simply entitled to less out of their 
local governments than whites.
246
 Because our racialized internal borders 
 
 
 243. Loren King, Federalism, Subsidiarity, and Cities, in FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY 291, 
302 (James E. Fleming & Jacob T. Levy eds., 2014).  
 244. Id.  
 245. See Gowder, Equal Law in an Unequal World, supra note 27, at 1036–37 (explaining that 
task is to find expressive meaning of the laws). 
 246. For a compelling version of this argument in the context of school segregation, see Kevin 
Brown, Termination of Public School Segregation: Determination of Unitary Status Based on the 
Elimination of Invidious Value Inculcation, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1124–25 (1990) (explaining 
that school segregation, in its social context, communicated the inferiority of black people and 
reinforced the value judgment embedded in that social meaning). The cognitive hierarchical model 
warrants applying Brown’s argument to the universe of racial injustice generally. See also PERRY, 
supra note 48, at 178 (“It is not the case that segregation itself creates inequality; it is the meaning and 
value that are attributed to the segregated spaces and the unequal distributions that go along with the 
racialization of spaces that produce and reproduce the existing inequality.”). 
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express the social hierarchy embedded into our racial categories, they are 
inconsistent with the rule of law. 
The foregoing conclusion can most directly be reached from the 
second-person point of view. We cannot attribute to black and Latino 
citizens of East Palo Alto any public reasons why they should comply with 
the laws excluding them from the public services of Palo Alto. For 
example, why not lie about their addresses and commit the crime of “theft 
of services,” if it means enrolling their children in the better schools next 
door? What public reasons can the state offer to explain why they ought to 
accept the laws barring them from educating their children as well as their 
neighbors’ children, in the face of racial segregation and concentrated 
poverty for which the state is, in part, responsible?  
The expressive impact of this kind of racial line-drawing—intentional 
or unintentional—has been recognized in our jurisprudence, but only in 
dissent. Most notably, Justice Thurgood Marshall, dissenting in Memphis 
v. Greene, notes that the lower court aptly described the case as one in 
which “an all white neighborhood is seeking to stop the traffic from an 
overwhelmingly black neighborhood from coming through their street,”247 
and expressed the constitutional interest at stake in the following terms:  
 This analysis ignores the plain and powerful symbolic message 
of the “inconvenience.” Many places to which residents of the area 
north of Hein Park would logically drive lie to the south of the 
subdivision. Until the closing of West Drive, the most direct route 
for those who lived on or near Springdale St. was straight down 
West Drive. Now the Negro drivers are being told in essence: “You 
must take the long way around because you don’t live in this 
‘protected’ white neighborhood.” Negro residents of the area north 
of Hein Park testified at trial that this is what they thought the city 
was telling them by closing West Drive. Even the District Court, 
which granted judgment for petitioners, conceded that “[o]bviously, 
the black people north of [Hein Park] . . . are being told to stay out 
of the subdivision.” In my judgment, this message constitutes a far 
greater adverse impact on respondents than the majority would 
prefer to believe. 
* * * 
 
 
 247. 451 U.S. 100, 137 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss2/10
  
 
 
 
 
2014] RACIAL CLASSIFICATION AND ASCRIPTIVE INJURY 381 
 
 
 
 
 The psychological effect of this barrier is likely to be significant. 
In his unchallenged expert testimony in the trial court, Dr. Marvin 
Feit, a professor of psychiatry at the University of Tennessee, 
predicted that the barrier between West Drive and Springdale St. 
will reinforce feelings about the city’s “favoritism” toward whites 
and will “serve as a monument to racial hostility.” The testimony of 
Negro residents and of a real estate agent familiar with the area 
provides powerful support for this prediction. As the District Court 
put it: “[Y]ou are not going to be able to convince those black 
people out there that they didn’t do it because they were black. They 
are helping a white neighborhood. Now, that is a problem that 
somebody is going to have to live with . . . .” I cannot subscribe to 
the majority’s apparent view that the city’s erection of this 
“monument to racial hostility” amounts to nothing more than a 
“slight inconvenience.” Thus, unlike the majority, I do not minimize 
the significance of the barrier itself in determining the harm 
respondents will suffer from its erection.
248
 
Justice Marshall’s analysis in the foregoing was directed at satisfying the 
Washington v. Davis intent requirement, but is just as compelling as a 
rejection of it: regardless of whether the state intended to write hostile 
racial attitudes into law, the harm caused by the state’s even inadvertent 
expression of those preexisting attitudes should be constitutionally 
cognizable.
249
  
The Equal Protection Clause is the constitutional location for the rule 
of law principle of generality.
250
 The foregoing analysis leads to the 
conclusion that local government boundaries that divide our urban areas 
into racialized spaces violate the Equal Protection Clause, and that the 
state is obliged to abolish either these boundaries or the economic and 
social inequalities that lead to their unjustifiability.
251
 
 
 
 248. Id. at 138–40 (internal notes and references omitted) (brackets and first and third sets of 
ellipses in the original). 
 249. See Gowder, Equal Law in an Unequal World, supra note 27, at 1038–39, 1044 (explaining 
that expressive content of a law is not the same as the subjective intentions of those who enacted it). 
 250. Id. at 1024, 1049, 1079–81. 
 251. See id. at 1058 (explaining that the rule of law requires states to either abolish unjustifiable 
laws or abolish the unjust social conditions that lead to their rule of law violations). One dramatic 
failure of the law to respond to this reality is in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corporation, 429 U.S. 252, 259 (1977), in which the Court applied the Washington v. 
Davis standard to refuse to entertain a race discrimination challenge to exclusionary zoning rules 
because the plaintiffs could not show that they were intentionally discriminatory rather than simply an 
effort to “protect property values.” The Court was confused. White aversion to blacks is instrumental 
in causing such property value declines. See David R. Harris, “Property Values Drop When Blacks 
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Returning to the example given above, it should be clear that nothing in 
this analysis requires the claim that the boundary between Palo Alto and 
East Palo Alto was created with the intention of reinforcing racial 
hierarchy, or even that the boundaries were originally caused by race in 
some fashion. All that matters is that they currently reinforce racial 
hierarchy with the laws, and that this reinforcement has the expressive 
effect of suggesting the inferiority of nonwhite racial groups, because of 
the lack of any other public justification for those boundaries in their 
social context.
252
 Even the fact that the state’s past intentional 
discrimination bears some of the responsibility for these conditions is not 
necessary to reach the conclusion that the state must refrain from 
reinforcing them today, although it intensifies the moral demand 
underneath that conclusion. 
By enforcing a legal boundary between Palo Alto and East Palo Alto, 
the state of California provides markedly inferior services to blacks and 
Latinos. In doing so, the state further impoverishes its citizens of color and 
makes it harder for them to move somewhere with better public goods. It 
makes them less well educated and thus deprives them of the human 
capital to earn more so they can buy their way out of segregation. It also 
supports the perception that black and Latino areas are high-crime areas 
(as would be any neighborhood with a concentrated lack of financial 
resources and inferior schools and police) and thereby perpetuates 
stereotypes of criminality associated with blacks and Latinos. The 
boundary supports continuing “voluntary” segregation by creating 
dangerous neighborhoods starved for public goods to which whites and the 
wealthy are unwilling to move. And it does all of this with borders that are 
 
 
Move in, Because . . .”: Racial and Socioeconomic Determinants of Neighborhood Desirability, 64 
AM. SOC. REV. 461, 461 (1999); see also Michelle Wilde Anderson & Victoria C. Plaut, Property 
Law: Implicit Bias and the Resilience of Spatial Colorlines, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE 
LAW 34–36 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012) (giving references on relationship 
between implicit bias and perception of property quality). The Court also missed the broader point, 
which is that those zoning laws support racial hierarchy whether intentionally or not. 
 252. Indeed, the exclusion of blacks and Latinos from Palo Alto runs much deeper than any 
conscious intent. For example, early educational disadvantage excludes blacks and Latinos from Palo 
Alto’s technology industry. In 2013, there were eleven states in which no black high school student 
took the AP computer science exam and eight states in which no Latino student did so. Barbara 
Ericson, Detailed Data on Pass Rates, Race, and Gender for 2013, CC.GATECH.EDU, 
http://home.cc.gatech.edu/ice-gt/556 (last visited Mar. 29, 2014) (see the Excel document on this site 
for additional data). In none of ten states in which the most black students took the exam were black 
students represented among exam-takers at the population rate. Id. In only five U.S. states did the 
percentage of takers who were black reach or exceed the percentage of blacks in the population—
Arizona, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, and South Dakota. Id. (from full data set, 
distributed via a spreadsheet). 
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understood by all to create racialized spaces—the white/Asian side of the 
freeway and the black/Latino side of the freeway—and, by predicating 
these patterns of superior and inferior services along racial lines, it sends 
the message that blacks and Latinos are not entitled to the public goods 
that those on the other side of the freeway claim by right of residence. The 
municipal border between Palo Alto and East Palo Alto is 
unconstitutional. 
This analysis is particularly important in the case of schools, where the 
Court has shown an unusual level of deference to local boundaries that 
facilitate de facto racial segregation. The Supreme Court’s unwillingness 
to do anything about the school context is typified by Milliken v. 
Bradley,
253
 which ruled that courts may not order a desegregation remedy 
for racially disparate school district lines unless plaintiffs can show that 
“the racially discriminatory acts of one or more school districts caused 
racial segregation in an adjacent district, or where district lines have been 
deliberately drawn on the basis of race.”254  
The extreme deference that the Court gave to local boundaries in 
Milliken is at odds with other case law indicating that states may not 
permit disparities in important constitutional interests to track arbitrary 
municipal boundaries. In Reynolds v. Sims,
255
 the Court struck down 
voting districts of unequal size as violating a principle of equal voting 
power for each citizen. Turning a deaf ear to the defense that the districts 
tracked local government borders, the Court pointed out that:  
 Political subdivisions of States—counties, cities, or whatever—
never were and never have been considered as sovereign entities. 
Rather, they have been traditionally regarded as subordinate 
governmental instrumentalities created by the State to assist in the 
carrying out of state governmental functions. As stated by the Court 
in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, these governmental units are 
“created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the 
governmental powers of the state as may be entrusted to them,” and 
the “number, nature and duration of the powers conferred upon 
[them] . . . and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests 
in the absolute discretion of the state.”
256
  
 
 
 253. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
 254. Id. at 745. 
 255. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 256. Id. at 575 (internal citations omitted) (alteration in original). 
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Yet in Milliken, the Court—when racial equality in education, a 
constitutional interest on a par with equal representation in the electorate, 
was at issue—said exactly the opposite:  
The [district] court’s analytical starting point was its conclusion that 
school district lines are no more than arbitrary lines on a map drawn 
“for political convenience.” Boundary lines may be bridged where 
there has been a constitutional violation calling for inter-district 
relief, but the notion that school district lines may be casually 
ignored or treated as a mere administrative convenience is contrary 
to the history of public education in our country. No single tradition 
in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the 
operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought 
essential both to the maintenance of community concern and 
support for public schools and to quality of the educational process. 
Thus, in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, we observed that 
local control over the educational process affords citizens an 
opportunity to participate in decision-making, permits the 
structuring of school programs to fit local needs, and encourages 
“experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for 
educational excellence.”
257
 
The “tradition” of local control of education on which the Court rests this 
implicit distinction is a thin reed indeed, since there has been an equally 
long tradition of local self-government in general, one that goes not only 
back to the colonies, but even back to Magna Carta.
258
 Yet such a tradition 
availed the state not a whit in Reynolds, and it ought not to have availed 
the state in Milliken.  
 
 
 257. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741–42 (internal citations omitted). For the consequences of Milliken, 
see CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, AFTER BROWN: THE RISE AND RETREAT OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 
40–99 (2004) (suggesting that Milliken led to increasing segregation across district lines). See also 
Brondolo et al., supra note 75, at 364 (explaining role of school district “fragmentation” in conjunction 
with white flight in educational segregation); Genevieve Siegel-Hawley, Educational 
Gerrymandering?: Race and Attendance Boundaries in a Demographically Changing Suburb, 83 
HARV. EDUC. REV. 580 (2013) (in-depth case study of school redistricting process in a suburban 
Virginia county that neglected the interests of nonwhite students and worsened segregation). 
 258. See generally Abby Williamson & Archon Fung, Public Deliberation: Where We Are and 
Where Can We Go?, NAT’L CIVIC REV., Winter 2004, at 3, 6–8 (describing colonial history and 
current persistence of New England town meeting as site of self-governance); Magna Carta, 1297, 25 
Edw. 1 c. 9 § 9 (“THE City of London shall have all the old Liberties and Customs [which it hath been 
used to have]. Moreover We will and grant, that all other Cities, Boroughs, Towns, and the Barons of 
the Five Ports, and all other Ports, shall have all their Liberties and free Customs.”). The quoted text is 
from the “traditional translation” as given by Her Majesty’s Government, available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Edw1cc1929/25/9/section/IX.  
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Moreover, our recent practice of creating increasingly more fragmented 
local government boundaries has not been with us forever. It is an artifact 
of political choice rather than structural necessity or long-held tradition.
259
 
To be sure, the considerations noted at the end of the Milliken excerpt 
above justify local control of schools. However, they do not require that 
the localities in question maintain their pre-litigation segregated borders—
those borders can be modified while retaining local control. As such, the 
Court ought to extend the principles it stated in Reynolds to permit 
challenges to racialized spaces, including school districts, that depend on 
local boundaries for their maintenance. 
1. Is This Just Disparate Impact Analysis? 
The careful reader may worry that the equal protection implications of 
this argument are entirely those which the Court rejected in Washington v. 
Davis: the proposition that the state is not permitted to take acts that have 
a disparate impact along racial lines.
260
 The argument of this Article is not 
so demanding. While Davis must partially go, it need not go altogether.  
Consider the facts of Davis. A police department used a pre-
employment test that had a disproportionate impact on black candidates.
261
 
If the test at issue in Davis created a racialized space in the form of the 
police department, or otherwise used the laws to support racial hierarchy, 
then the test would be subject to challenge on the theory articulated in this 
Article. However, whether the test supported racial hierarchy is a distinct 
inquiry from whether it had a disparate impact—the two can easily come 
apart. Suppose, for example, the test had a very large disparate impact: it 
excluded, say, ninety percent of all black police officer candidates and 
only ten percent of white candidates. Under such circumstances, it would 
likely have created a police department that essentially excluded blacks 
and would have risked sending the message to the community at large that 
law enforcement is entrusted distinctively to whites. The police 
department would have become a white institution. In addition, the nearly 
all-white police department would likely exacerbate other components of 
racial hierarchy, such as discriminatory policing and lack of access to 
economic opportunities for blacks. In short, it would create a situation 
 
 
 259. See generally GREGORY R. WEIHER, THE FRACTURED METROPOLIS: POLITICAL 
FRAGMENTATION AND METROPOLITAN SEGREGATION 176–95 (1991) (describing historical and 
political forces leading up to contemporary levels of urban fragmentation). 
 260. I thank Bill Buss for pressing me to address this worry. 
 261. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
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much like what led to the recent protests and tear-gassings over the police 
killing of an unarmed black teenager in Ferguson, Missouri, a majority-
black community whose police department had only three black officers 
out of fifty-three.
262
 Under those circumstances, the Davis pre-
employment test would manifestly be subject to challenge under the 
theory articulated in this Article. 
By contrast, suppose that the test had a very small disparate impact: 
black candidates were two percent more likely to be excluded. Such a 
disparity would still be subject to challenge under an ordinary disparate 
impact test. However, it might not have been subject to challenge under 
the theory of this Article because it would not so obviously have been a 
component of racial hierarchy. In terms of the rule of law principle of 
generality that gives life to the Equal Protection Clause, the establishment 
of a police department with a 2% racial disparity would probably not 
express the inequality of blacks—blacks and whites alike would still have 
had public reasons to accept the legal authority of the officers of such a 
department. The Washington v. Davis rule must be compromised, not 
eliminated: the state cannot be allowed to prop up genuine racial hierarchy 
with its laws, but nothing in this Article requires the policing of incidental 
disparate racial impact. 
To summarize, the constitutional problem with racial disparity—
accessed through the expressive ideas underlying the rule of law and, with 
it, the Equal Protection Clause—is not the mere fact of disparity. Rather, 
the problem is that the state, by participating in the self-reinforcing system 
of interrelated racial disparities which I have called “racial hierarchy,” 
expresses and perpetuates—whether it means to or not—the inferior status 
of those who are subjected to subordinate racial ascriptions.
263
  
2. Requirement as Permission 
Since the state’s obligation to end its support for racialized spaces does 
not depend on their intentional creation, neither does its license to do so. 
Consider again Parents Involved,
264
 in which the Supreme Court struck 
down the attempts of several school districts to remedy de facto racial 
 
 
 262.  Paulina Firozi, 5 Things to Know About Ferguson Police Department, USA TODAY (Aug. 19, 
2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/08/14/ferguson-police-department-details/ 
14064451/. 
 263. See Gowder, Equal Law in an Unequal World, supra note 27, at 1072–73 (explaining 
difference between “equality as identity,” which demands formal identical treatment or outcomes 
between different people, and “equal status,” which demands that people be treated as equals). 
 264. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
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segregation in their school systems, on the grounds that the schools were 
not responding to intentional state segregation.
265
  
As a first pass, the evidence in Parts II and III suggests that the notion 
of sorting out what counts as intentional state segregation is simply 
absurd. Consider the following loose sketch of the incredibly tangled 
causes of contemporary black-white educational inequality, which is based 
on the research discussed above.  
To start, some who are in the workforce today suffered under 
intentionally segregated schools. Their long-term earning prospects, and 
hence multigenerational wealth, will have suffered from that segregation. 
And, in turn, their children (and grandchildren, and so on) will have lacked 
the educational benefits that wealth can bring, including, e.g., access to 
wealthier school districts with better schools, access to preschools, tutors, 
test prep, and the like, as well as resources to pay college tuition. That 
intergenerational wealth disparity, as well as geographic isolation, will 
also be exacerbated by the consequences of past intentional residential 
segregation.  
Past residential segregation—which contributes to continuing 
segregation today due not only to reduced geographic mobility due to 
wealth disparities, but also to, inter alia, inheritance of homes, the return 
of children to their neighborhoods of origin, family caretaking 
responsibilities, and the like—leads to the present concentration of low-
income black families in discrete neighborhoods, which in turn leads to 
underfunded schools in those neighborhoods. The poverty in those 
neighborhoods contributes to crime; law enforcement responses to that 
crime as well as to racial stereotypes about criminality exacerbate that 
poverty, and hence that crime; this in turn further reduces local wealth. At 
the same time, residents of those neighborhoods may be more likely to be 
victimized by crime, again impairing their overall wealth—and ability to 
escape poverty and segregation—as well as educational performance.  
Teachers in predominantly black schools, affected by unconscious 
racial biases relative to intelligence and educational aptitude, will expect 
less of their students and work less hard to cause each student to succeed. 
Students, victims of stereotype threat, will achieve less and in turn will 
confirm the racial stereotypes held by their teachers. The parents of 
students in those schools are subject to conscious or unconscious 
employment discrimination, forcing them to work more for less pay; this 
will in turn undermine their ability to raise their children to succeed 
 
 
 265. Id. at 720–21. 
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educationally—depriving them of the time, for example, to read to their 
children.  
Living in segregated neighborhoods in which there are few role models 
for achievement (thanks to the above factors), many black high schoolers 
will lack knowledge of the available college options, external evidence 
(such as role models) to believe that they can achieve access to the best 
schools, and knowledge of strategies to do so (such as, for example, how 
to write a strong admissions essay). Their families, of course, will also 
lack longstanding ties with the highest-status institutions and other forms 
of social capital facilitating access to them.  
In these environments, parents will—rationally, recognizing that the 
deck is stacked against them from the start—have lower expectations for 
their children’s achievement; this in turn, however, will suppress that 
achievement, becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, both because of the 
lowered incentive to support educational goals and because of stereotype 
threat. Stereotypes about parental involvement, in turn, will affect 
teachers’ willingness to try to recruit parental support for student 
achievement.  
The outcomes of all these disparities further reinforce conscious and 
unconscious biases, as whites see blackness associated with lower 
educational and occupational achievement and higher crime. The result: 
“de facto” racial segregation in schools and racial educational disparity, 
which, via its effects on poverty, crime, residence, the beliefs held by 
others, and the educational condition of the next generation, further 
reinforces racial hierarchy and the conditions that created it in the first 
place. 
Now suppose Seattle School District No. 1 decides to intervene on this 
sorry situation by driving a few school buses around to de-racialize the 
schools. Are they “remedying the effects of intentional state 
discrimination?” Who can say?266 And why, in the face of such a mess, 
should we even ask that question? Instead, recognizing that the municipal 
boundaries that demarcate school districts amount to racialized spaces—
and that in enforcing those boundaries, the state of Washington is 
supporting racial hierarchy with its laws—the Court should have held that 
the school district was not forbidden, but rather required, to remedy its de 
facto educational segregation. 
 
 
 266. In reality, we can. As discussed in Parts II and III, past intentional state action has been at the 
root of the cultural significance of race—and has thereby been the catalyst for continuing private 
discrimination—since the end of the seventeenth century. But the constitutional point goes through 
even if we assume that long-term causal influence is too attenuated to support a contemporary remedy. 
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This point extends far beyond the schools. Once we recognize that all 
racialized spaces, racialized opportunities, and racialized practices are 
built out of the same recursive mix of intentional and unintentional public 
and private action, we see that the state must act to eliminate those 
racializations without having to try to trace out the causal links between 
any given racialization and intentional state discrimination.
267
  
Thus, recognizing the general public responsibility for the hierarchy 
built into racial classification allows the state to stop supporting what 
Loury has identified as the core mechanism of racial inequality. In his 
words:  
[D]urable racial inequality can best be understood as the outgrowth 
of a series of what Myrdal (1944) called “vicious circles of 
cumulative causation.” Tacit association of “blackness” with 
“unworthiness” in the American public’s imagination affects 
cognitive processes and promotes essentialist causal misattributions. 
When confronted by the facts of racially disparate achievement, the 
racially disproportionate transgression of legal strictures, and 
racially unequal development of productive potential, observers will 
have difficulty identifying with the plight of a group of people 
whom they (mistakenly) think are simply “reaping what they have 
sown.” In such a case, there will be little public support for 
egalitarian policies benefiting a stigmatized racial group. This, in 
turn, encourages the reproduction through time of racial inequality 
because, absent some policies of this sort, the low social conditions 
of many blacks persist, the negative social meanings ascribed to 
blackness are then reinforced, and so the racially biased social-
cognitive processes are reproduced, completing the circle.
268
 
Had the Court recognized these processes in Parents Involved, the Seattle 
School District’s attempts at remedial integration could have been upheld.  
Note further that nothing in this Part requires that the state, by taking 
these measures, be able to solve the problem of racial hierarchy. It will 
probably take more than a few (or even many) school buses to solve racial 
inequality. This Article does not attempt to perform a standard strict 
scrutiny analysis, wherein there must exist a compelling interest in 
abolishing racial hierarchy (which surely there is) and the state must show 
 
 
 267. By contrast, under current law, the state must meet a high evidentiary bar to prove that its 
remedial use of race responds to a situation caused by prior state intentional discrimination. Wygant v. 
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273–74 (1986). 
 268. Loury, The Author’s Account, supra note 74, at 82. 
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that its measures are narrowly tailored to achieve that end. Rather, the 
claim here is much simpler and more direct: even if the state cannot end 
racial hierarchy, it is required to stop participating in its continuance.  
I submit that such a remedy should not face strict scrutiny even under 
current doctrine, as the argument is not that the state is remedying the 
effects of past discrimination but rather that its laws are continuing to 
discriminate, albeit not in an unproblematically “intentional” way. Thus, 
stopping that discrimination, such as by abolishing racialized municipal 
boundaries, ought not to count as a racial classification for Equal 
Protection purposes. 
However, recall that the requirement that the state stop participating 
with its laws in the maintenance of racialized spaces leaves the state two 
options: it may either abolish the laws (i.e., the municipal boundaries) or it 
may act to change the social conditions that make the laws disparate (i.e., 
carry out a program of integration).
269
 The latter choice would be subject 
to strict scrutiny under current doctrine.
270
 However, such state action 
would be narrowly tailored to satisfy a compelling interest in stopping the 
state’s support for racial hierarchy.  
Moreover, while there is not currently enough evidence to be sure, such 
efforts might affirmatively promote racial justice, and thus potentially be 
narrowly tailored even with respect to that more demanding end. A well-
supported psychological mechanism known as the contact hypothesis 
suggests that state-sponsored integration might help heal the warped 
cognitions underlying racial hierarchy.
271
 According to the contact 
hypothesis, intergroup contact can reduce intergroup bias.
272
 Yet, despite 
its strong scientific support, not a single federal case within the Lexis 
 
 
 269. See Gowder, Equal Law in an Unequal World, supra note 27, at 1058 (explaining disjunctive 
character of rule of law judgments). 
 270. Nothing said in this Article is meant to be an endorsement of that doctrinal choice. Actually, 
the Supreme Court ought to adopt an “anti-subordination” approach to Equal Protection rather than an 
“anti-classification” approach. See generally Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and 
Future Equal Protection Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059 (2011) (offering a cogent argument along 
these lines). But the text here is meant to acknowledge how the argument of this Article functions in 
the doctrine we have now. 
 271. See generally Thomas F. Pettigrew, Intergroup Contact Theory, 49 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 65 
(1998) (reviewing evidence on intergroup contact theory). It is important to note that the contact 
hypothesis has come under some sustained attack in recent years, particularly from Putnam’s oft-cited 
critique. Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century, 
30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137, 141–49 (2007). However, psychologists have refined their 
research in response, and the contact hypothesis remains a well-supported psychological regularity. 
See generally Ananthi Al Ramiah & Miles Hewstone, Intergroup Contact as a Tool for Reducing, 
Resolving, and Preventing Intergroup Conflict: Evidence, Limitations, and Potential, 68 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 527, 534 (2013) (addressing Putnam’s critique).  
 272. See generally Pettigrew, supra note 271.  
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database includes the phrase “contact hypothesis,” and “intergroup 
contact” appears only three times, never in a case that remains good law to 
support a ruling that the state may carry out integrative efforts.
273
 This 
suggests that the legal system is missing scientific knowledge that can 
explain the state’s interest in integration. 
As implicit bias is a major component in the hierarchical nature of race, 
it too must be ameliorated. Although social scientists have not gotten very 
far yet in figuring out what eliminates implicit bias, early evidence seems 
to suggest that promoting interracial contact and recognition of the innate 
similarity between the “races” is a promising direction.274 At least one 
psychological study aiming to explain why the contact hypothesis shows 
up so reliably in empirical results found that “blurring intergroup 
boundaries”—by identifying similarities between group members—can 
reduce implicit bias.
275
 Other studies have suggested that, at least in the 
short term, placing people in counter-stereotypic social contexts (such as 
when the experimenter, qua high-status authority figure, is black) can 
reduce implicit bias—further support for a program of social integration 
that reduces the extent to which whites only see blacks in stereotyped 
roles.
276
 
 
 
 273. Search for “contact hypothesis” conducted on March 10, 2014. By contrast, a Google Scholar 
search for the same phrase on the same date yielded 11,200 results, indicating the importance of the 
concept in the research literature.  
 In all American case law available on Lexis, the phrase “contact hypothesis” appears to have 
shown up only twice, both in state court cases where defendants attempted to challenge eyewitness 
identifications based on the psychological evidence for the difficulty of cross-racial identification. 
People v. Abney, No. 3314/05 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 5, 2011); Smith v. State, 857 A.2d 1198 (Md. App. 
2004), rev’d, 880 A.2d 288 (Md. 2005). 
 Search for “intergroup contact” (and “inter group contact,” “inter-group contact”) conducted on 
December 23, 2014. It showed up in dissent in the 9th Circuit opinion in Parents Involved, 377 F.3d 
949, 993 n.12, 1011 n.39 (9th Cir. 2004) (Graber, J., dissenting), in the vacated district court opinion 
in Fisher v. Texas, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 605 (W.D. Tex 2009), and at some length in Comfort v. Lynn 
School Committee, 418 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005) (and prior procedural history), a case which came to the 
right result, but, unfortunately, upheld an assignment program similar to that rejected by the Supreme 
Court two years later in Parents Involved---and which thus must be understood as overruled. See 
Comfort v. Lynn School Committee, 560 F. 3d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 2009) (upholding, on procedural 
grounds, denial of motion for relief from judgment in view of Parents Involved; noting “distinct 
resemblance” between Parents Involved policy and Lynn policy). Intergroup contact also shows up in 
one early state case, Newberg v. Board of Pub. Educ., 1983 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 1, 26 Pa. D. & 
C.3d 682 (1983), concerning gender-segregated high schools. 
 274. See generally Calvin K. Lai et al., Reducing Implicit Prejudice, 7 SOC. & PERSONALITY 
PSYCHOL. COMPASS 315 (2013) (reviewing current state of research). 
 275. Natalie R. Hall et al., Reducing Implicit Prejudice by Blurring Intergroup Boundaries, 31 
BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 244, 244 (2009).  
 276. See Jan De Houwer et al., Implicit Measures: A Normative Analysis and Review, 135 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 347, 351–52 (2009) (citing examples).  
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C. Standing and Racial Injury 
Plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief in race discrimination cases against 
the government often face a high hurdle to demonstrate standing because 
they must prove that they are likely to be subject to the same injury in the 
future.
277
 But if hierarchical race itself is an injury, then all persons 
ascribed subordinated racial status are subject to a continuing injury. 
Therefore, any standing concerns are eliminated. The plaintiff in City of 
Los Angeles v. Lyons, for example, need not have shown that he would be 
personally subject to racially discriminatory police chokeholds in the 
future to seek injunctive relief.
 278
 Rather, he could simply have shown that 
he suffered a continuing injury from being a member of a class seen as fair 
game for police violence—the injury of degraded status as well as its real-
world consequences, such as living in fear of the police and the social and 
economic consequences of disparate criminal attention. And he could have 
shown that the challenged practice supported that continuing injury—that 
a practice of applying dangerous chokeholds to black citizens gives every 
black citizen reason to fear and avoid encounters with the police (we 
recently relearned this in the tragic death of Eric Garner). This fear 
furthers the general social subordination of every black citizen.  
Drawing out the chain of influence still further, the general fear in 
which black citizens rationally hold the police likely deters those in 
segregated black communities from seeking police assistance against 
crime, exacerbating both the problem of crime in black communities and 
the stereotype of blacks as criminals. Those consequences, in turn, lead in 
yet another vicious cycle to still more police violence against blacks. To 
this day, Lyons likely suffers continuing economic and social injury as 
well as physical danger from these facts, including a higher likelihood of 
being harmed either by criminals or by the police in the future. Each of 
these consequences is caused in part by the fact that officers of the LAPD 
viewed themselves as licensed to arbitrarily inflict extraordinary violence 
on blacks with whom they came into contact.  
Likewise, the plaintiffs in Allen v. Wright could have shown that by 
permitting a tax exemption to racially discriminatory private schools, the 
IRS financially and expressively supported the existence of racialized 
 
 
 277. See Raj Shah, Note, An Article III Divided Against Itself Cannot Stand: A Critical Race 
Perspective on the U.S. Supreme Court’s Standing Jurisprudence, 61 UCLA L. REV. 198, 204–08 
(2013) (detailing cases in which racial discrimination plaintiffs were denied injunctive relief for lack 
of standing in view of their inability to show a likely future injury). 
 278. 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss2/10
  
 
 
 
 
2014] RACIAL CLASSIFICATION AND ASCRIPTIVE INJURY 393 
 
 
 
 
spaces. In doing so, it exacerbated a general social racial hierarchy that 
placed those classified as black into a subordinate position. The plaintiffs 
are harmed by that hierarchy—ascriptive injury—just like everyone else 
subject to that classification.
279
 The plaintiffs should have been permitted 
to prevail on such a showing instead of being required, as in the actual 
case, to show that they would have individually had better educational 
opportunities in the absence of the tax exemption.
 
Not having the benefit 
of an analysis of how we actually use racial classifications, the Supreme 
Court outright held the opposite in Allen, ruling that “abstract stigmatic 
injury” is insufficient to confer standing on a plaintiff.280 Allen must be 
overruled. 
This reform is a direct implication of the cognitive hierarchical model, 
which licenses the conclusion that racial hierarchy disadvantages those 
with stigmatized racial identities in an individual and definite—rather than 
group and probabilistic—sense. The remediable injury for standing 
purposes is not just that Lyons had some positive probability of being 
subjected to future police violence, economic disadvantage, crime, and the 
like by virtue of his membership in the group of black people and the 
network of public and private components of racial hierarchy, including 
LAPD chokeholds. It is also that he suffered a definite continuing and 
personal injury from holding an ascriptive classification that subjected him 
personally to status degradation in the minds of others, and because the 
state, by supporting racial inequality through practices like the chokehold 
policy, promoted the continuing association of his identity with that status 
classification.  
CONCLUSION: A NEW COLORBLINDNESS 
Racial ascriptions can be harmful. That fact was vividly brought into 
the legal system most recently in the mid-1980s, when a group of plaintiffs 
brought suit in Louisiana to challenge the ascription “colored” on their 
parents’ birth certificates.281 The court rejected their claims, but it is 
helpful to ask why they felt the need to bring the case in the first place. 
For, by 1985, when the Louisiana Court of Appeals ruled on the case, the 
principle of strict scrutiny for government racial classifications
282
 and the 
 
 
 279. 468 U.S. 737 (1984) 
 280. Id. at 755–56. 
 281. Doe v. State, 479 So.2d 369, 371 (La. Ct. App. 1985). 
 282. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (commanding strict scrutiny for racial 
classifications). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
394 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:325 
 
 
 
 
major statutory frameworks that prohibited private discrimination in areas 
such as housing
283
 and employment
284
 had commanded the legal 
irrelevance of race for decades. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs doubtless richly 
recognized the social relevance of race and of the racial ascriptions that the 
state creates and supports. So they—rationally—wanted no part of it.285 
Earlier scholars have aptly argued that unintentionally discriminatory 
state action should be subject to challenge when it arises from unconscious 
racism or the unconscious negative cultural meaning of stigmatized 
race.
286
 This Article offers a broader point: state action, intentional or 
unintentional, ought to be subject to challenge when it contributes to the 
pernicious social and psychological meaning of race, which the Louisiana 
plaintiffs knew so well. And the reason is not merely because that social 
meaning leads to concrete harms, though it doubtless does so.
287
 Rather, it 
is because of the special nature of those harms in a liberal democracy.  
Ascriptive injuries are not just ordinary injuries, or even unfair injuries 
that fall disparately on a disadvantaged sector of the population. The 
expressive theory of Equal Protection shows that because ascriptive 
injuries are distinctively not susceptible to public justification, a state 
cannot inflict them and still claim to be acting in the name of its citizens 
understood as a general community of shared interest. For that reason, 
ascriptive injuries are inconsistent with the notion of a democracy of equal 
citizens under the rule of law that animates the Equal Protection Clause.  
Public justifiability is a universalizing ideal at the heart of democratic 
political philosophy. It finds its highest classical expression in Jean-
Jacques Rousseau’s conception of the general will of a political 
community, which cannot enact laws with a “particular object.”288 Race 
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conservatives implicitly appeal to such a universalizing ideal when they 
insist that the government must be “colorblind,” meaning free of attention 
to race. Understanding the constraints and demands public justifiability 
imposes on governmental action with respect to race can help us 
understand where race conservatives have gone wrong, and how 
colorblindness can be reclaimed for a progressive legal project. 
The rhetoric of colorblindness has changed political hands over the 
years. It began as a possession of the left, of Martin Luther King and the 
civil rights movement, expressed in the hope that one might be judged “on 
the basis of the content of his character rather than the color of his skin.”289 
It currently seems to be a property of the right: colorblindness has become 
a slogan of, for example, those opposed to affirmative action.
290
  
But a reclaimed colorblindness that demands that state action be 
publicly justifiable to the community taken as a whole has the potential to 
mean nothing less than the abolition of race, at least in its current, 
hierarchical form. And this abolition moves through colorblindness in the 
strictest sense of the term: since hierarchy is built into our very perceptual 
structure for race, it calls for us to genuinely, on an individual as well as a 
societal level, become blind to race. When racial categories cease to be 
salient to us, when we cease to rely on socially constructed perceptions in 
which we ascribe racial classifications based on information about social 
standing, then true colorblindness will have been achieved.
291
 
Colorblindness, in its true form, should be distinguished from what 
Sumi Cho has called “post-racialism.”292 As Cho has pointed out, the post-
racialist project, which denies the importance or legitimacy of race-
conscious action to remedy racial hierarchy, depends on a “racial 
progress/transcendence narrative,” which claims that American society has 
progressed beyond its past racial hierarchies.
293
 The psychological 
literature may help to explain why post-racialism is appealing to so 
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many—perhaps because it accommodates aversive racism, by allowing 
those with implicit biases to deny the social impact of those biases and 
avoid confronting the need for collective change—while at the same time 
grounding a rejection of the “progress/transcendence narrative” on which 
it rests. 
Should race progressives and critical race theorists take on the 
hierarchical construction of our racial classifications in universalistic 
terms, and reclaim the ideal of colorblindness to advocate the elimination 
of the status-loaded classificatory practices built into our current operation 
of racial categories themselves, the left and right might find common 
ground. The moral principles underlying the political programs of both left 
and right can endorse the elimination of government-supported racial 
hierarchy in the pursuit of the universalizing ideal of the liberal democratic 
state. 
The catch is that the path to such genuine colorblindness does not go 
through blindness to the current reality of race. A passive state and a 
passive society cannot change our deeply rooted biases or the social 
structures that reinforce and are reinforced by them. Only by coordinated 
action from the state—to uproot the structural causes of racial bias in 
segregation, residential and otherwise—and from civil society—to 
promote genuine social, cultural and economic integration—can the ideal 
of colorblindness be achieved. Now is the time for the Supreme Court to 
stop standing in the way, and for policymakers, using the insights of 
sociology and psychology, to determine how best to put an end to racial 
hierarchy.  
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